University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2007

Coalition Formation And Teamwork In Embodied Agents
Majid Ali Khan
University of Central Florida

Part of the Computer Engineering Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Khan, Majid Ali, "Coalition Formation And Teamwork In Embodied Agents" (2007). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations, 2004-2019. 3226.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/3226

COALITION FORMATION AND TEAMWORK IN EMBODIED AGENTS

by
MAJID ALI KHAN
B.S. GIK Institute of Technology, 1997

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in the College of Engineering and Computer Science
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Fall Term
2007

Major Professor: Ladislau Bölöni

c 2007 Majid Ali Khan
°

ii

ABSTRACT

Embodied agents are agents acting in the physical world, such as persons, robots, unmanned
air or ground vehicles and so on. These types of agents are subject to spatio-temporal
constraints, which do not exist for agents acting in a virtual environment. The movement of
embodied agents is limited by obstacles and maximum velocity, while their communication
is limited by the transmission range of their wireless devices.
This dissertation presents contributions to the techniques of coalition formation and
teamwork coordination for embodied agents. We considered embodied agents in three different settings, each of them representative of a class of practical applications. First, we study
coalition formation in the one dimensional world of vehicles driving on a highway. We assume
that vehicles can communicate over short distances and carry agents which can advise the
driver on convoy formation decisions. We introduce techniques which allow vehicles to influence the speed of the convoys, and show that this yields convoys which have a higher utility
for the participating vehicles. Second, we address the problem of coalition formation in the
two dimensional world. The application we consider is a disaster response scenario. The
agents are forming coalitions through a multi-issue negotiation with spatio-temporal components where the coalitions maintain a set of commitments towards participating agents.
Finally, we discuss a scenario where embodied agents form coalitions to optimally address dynamic, non-deterministic, spatio-temporal tasks. The application we consider is firefighters
acting in a disaster struck city.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation presents contributions to the techniques of coalition formation and teamwork coordination for embodied agents. While coalition formation was extensively studied
in abstract task and worth oriented domains and in virtual environments, relatively little
research was done on the requirements posed by the physical world on the teamwork process. Agents living in the physical world are subject to spatio-temporal constraints, and their
interaction is influenced by the geographical constraints and the available communication
framework. Our work centered on three, progressively more difficult research topics. Each
of these topics was studied in the context of scenarios of immediate practical application.
• Coalition formation in the 1-dimensional world. The specific scenario we studied was
convoy driving on the highway, where the vehicles can communicate with each other to
determine the optimal convoy configuration as well as the speed of the convoy, which
can be influenced by the desires of the participating vehicles.
• Coalition formation in the 2-dimensional world. The scenario we considered is convoy
formation in a disaster response scenario. In this scenario we assumed that the objective of the coalition formation is to minimize the time to destination of the agents, by
allowing convoys to traverse dangerous areas. Our solution relies on a spatio-temporal
multi-issue negotiation model where convoys maintain a set of commitments towards
participating agents.
• Coalition formation in the domain of dynamic, nondeterministic, spatio-temporal tasks.
1

Here we consider, in addition to the physical convoy formation, the agents need to coordinate their actions in the execution of specific tasks. In our example, we considered
firefighter agents which need to form efficient teams to fight a number of fires of various
sizes and intensities in a disaster stricken city.
In the remained of this Chapter, we provide a brief introduction to “embodied agent”,
the need for developing coalition formation and coordination techniques for embodied agents
and a summary of our contribution in this research domain.

1.1

Embodied agents

A software agent is defined to be an entity that can perceive its environment and act on it
in an autonomous manner. The autonomous behavior of the agent can range from simple
reactive behavior to complex learning and decision making processes. A multi agent system
is composed of multiple agents that can interact with each other. The interaction between
these agents can vary from simple message exchanges to more complex negotiation schemes.
An ‘embodied agent’ is defined as an agent that operates in the physical world. The
physical environment imposes several constraints on the embodied agents which are not
applicable in the virtual world. Some of these constraints include:
• Spatial constraints: The spatial constraints are imposed due to the location of the
agent in the physical world. For example, 1) the agent will need to move to a certain
location before it can perform a task, or 2) the agent can not communicate with any
other agent because of its current location (because other agents are outside its communication range), or 3) the agent can only perceive information within certain distance of
2

its current location because of limited visibility etc. Some virtual environment applications provide a notion of location by means of context awareness or location awareness
approaches. However, in such environments, the context is mainly used to limit the
behavior of the agent. It does not impose mobility or visibility constraints on the
agent.
• Temporal constraints: The temporal constraints are usually a direct result of current
location of the agent. For example, if a task needs to be completed within given
time then an agent at a far away place might not be able to reach the task location
within that time frame. Similarly, if two agents are in motion, they might get a small
temporal window to exchange their messages. Some virtual environments provide a
notion of temporal constraints. For example, in deadline oriented negotiations, there
is a need to complete negotiation before given deadline. But even in these cases, the
agents do not have to comply with both location and temporal constraints at the same
time. For example, it is sufficient to guarantee that the buyer can get the book before
Monday. The buyer and seller do not have to meet at certain location between certain
time period to finalize a deal. In a physical environment, we usually have temporal
constraints along with location constraints. For example, two fire brigades have to
reach a burning building within half an hour.
• Communication constraints: The communication constraints are also a direct result of the current location and the transmission power of the communication devices.
In many cases, if a communication infrastructure is not in place, the agent can only

3

communicate within certain communication range. This determines the agents with
which it can communicate and requires a dynamic discovery and information exchange
mechanism. Even when the communication infrastructure is in place, data about the
physical environment need to be collected and stored at some central location. The
usual scheme of every agent transferring its data to all other agents does not scale in the
physical environment. In a virtual environment, either all the agents are presumed to
have global knowledge, or they can directly communicate with each other to exchange
relevant information. This is usually not possible in the physical world.
• Mobility constraints: The mobility constraints are determined by the location and
the speed of the agent. Also, the physical world incorporates several physical hurdles
in the mobility of an agent. For example, a vehicle based agent can only rely on
the existing road network for its mobility. The mobility also means that the agent
surrounding environment will change constantly. This means that the agent has to
be designed to handle potentially very large number of world states. Mobile agents
need to incorporate path planning mechanisms to reach from a source location to a
destination location. Path planning is computationally expensive and restricts certain
team formation approaches. For example, it can become computationally cumbersome
for an agent to repeatedly invoke path planning to evaluate its current team formation
approach. Since virtual agent are not usually mobile, they do not have to deal with
such constraints and their complexity.

4

1.2

Coalition formation and team work in embodied agents

There have been lot of studies for coalition formation in the virtual environment [Kra97,
KG02, SK95b, SK95a, SK96, SL97, KR84, KST03, GL03]. Coalition formation in the physical
environment is relatively less studied. Although, as we will show later, they have a wide
range of applications.
The physical environment, as described above, imposes constraints which are not present
in the virtual environment. Due to these constraints, the theoretical model and techniques
developed for fully virtual agents are not immediately applicable in the physical domain. In
a virtual environment, the agents are usually placed in a static environment and coalition
formation process is mainly concerned with handling tasks and resources in an efficient
manner. On the other hand, in a physical environment, the embodied agents are usually
in motion and need to act in dynamically changing environment. The spatial and temporal
constraints limit the agent capabilities in performing certain tasks. For example, in a virtual
environment coalition formation, the agents can agree on certain tasks and each one of them
can individually perform its tasks. While in a physical environment, a coalition formation
process might require that the agents agree and join some rendezvous location in the physical
space before given time so that they can function as a team.
Similarly, negotiation between agents is another example that distinguishes virtual and
physical environment negotiation process. In the virtual world, negotiation between multiple
agents is usually modelled as split the pie(s) game [BOR92,OR94b] where the participants are
negotiating over the partitioning of a pie. Multi-issue negotiations can be handled by having

5

to split multiple pies, the agents total utility being a function of the pie shares. The issues
under negotiation are assigned monotonically increasing utility function. The individual
agents then strive for obtaining the largest worth of pie(s). However, in the physical world,
a negotiation for a an issue, like rendezvous location in 2-dimensional world, does not have
a well defined utility function. The same rendezvous location can provide different utility to
an agent depending upon parameters like time of rendezvous, path after rendezvous etc.
This distinction between virtual and physical environment for coalition formation and
team work motivated us to work in this area of research. We observed that even some of the
simplistic applications of coalition formation in physical environment were quite challenging.
Following Section 1.3 provides a summary of our contribution and findings in this area.

1.3

Contributions

The major contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We have developed and analyzed a dynamic coalition formation mechanism for vehicles
moving in the one dimensional physical world. The mechanism incorporates the utility
for the individual vehicles to join a convoy based on their measured and desired speed.
We introduce techniques which allow vehicles to influence the speed of the convoys. We
also evaluate and compare three different influence mechanisms at both microscopic
and macroscopic scale. We show that our approach yields convoys which have a higher
utility for the participating vehicles.
• We have developed a negotiation based coalition formation mechanism for agents moving in a two dimensional world. The negotiation mechanism allows the agents to nego6

tiate over a set of location and time constraints to join and leave the convoy. We use a
commitment based model where the agents store their existing commitments and use
it to evaluate or build new offers. Our approach includes several heuristics to restrict
the negotiation space. We test the coalition formation mechanism in a scenario where
multiple agents with limited communication range need to negotiate about spatial and
temporal issues in a disaster struck area.
• We have developed a methodology for coalition formation of agents with the goal
of solving a set of dynamic, non-deterministic, spatio-temporal tasks. We present a
generic solution approach which models this class of problems using Markov decision
processes (MDP). We apply our generic approach to a concrete problem of allocating
firefighters in a disaster struck site. We discuss techniques to reduce the complexity
of the resulting MDP. We show that the MDP based solution outperforms baseline
approaches over a wide range of experimental settings.

1.4

Organization of dissertation

This dissertation is organized in the following way. In Chapter 2, we present related work
in team work and coalition formation. We present an application of coalition formation in
“embodied agent” with convoy driving in one dimensional world in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4,
we extend the coalition formation mechanism for convoy driving in two dimensional world.
Chapter 5 describes our approach towards coalition formation in the domain of dynamic,
nondeterministic, spatio-temporal tasks. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the summary of our
work and the conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK

In this Chapter, we provide an overview of previous work done in the domain of coalition
formation and teamwork. There is significant previous research in this domain for software
agents residing in the virtual environment. So we concentrate only on the approaches which
have the promise of applicability in the physical environment as well. There is significantly
smaller body of work in this domain for embodied agents. In Section 2.1, we provide details
of teamwork in virtual world (i.e. using software agents or software based models). We
then describe various coalition formation approaches used in this domain in Section 2.2. In
Section 2.3, we provide details of teamwork and coalition formation in the physical world
(i.e. between physical objects like robots or embedded devices) and then in Section 2.4 we
provide details of related work in embedded devices.

2.1

Agent teamwork in the virtual world

Coordination is one of the key aspect of multi-agent teamwork. Coordination, in general,
has been an active research area in distributed systems and [NLJ96] is good review of many
of coordination techniques and their general characteristics. Coordination is required in
a system consisting of disparate entities for various reasons. It enables these entities to
work together coherently and without chaos. The coordination techniques are required for
systems where resources, information or expertise is distributed across several entities. It
is also applicable in domains where dependencies exist between agents actions or where
multiple agents can solve a problem more efficiently.
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There are several coordination techniques that have been used in multi-agent teamwork.
These can be classified as:
• Coordination based on team structure
• Contract based coordination
• Multi-agent planning and shared plans
• Joint intentions
• Negotiation based coordination
• Coordination based on physical laws
• Collective behavior

2.1.1

Coordination based on team structure

Coordination based on team structure is one of the earliest approaches in coordination. It
is based on prior knowledge of the team organization where each agent has a predefined
set of capabilities, responsibilities, connectivity and control flow. It results in a typical
master/slave coordination scheme where a master agent orchestrates coordination between
slave agents. Durfee et al [DLC88] terms it as a “predefined long term relationship” between
agents. It is usually used in task and resource allocation problems where the problem can
be easily decomposed in subproblems. There are several ways to implement this technique.
One of the classical approach is blackboard architecture [Hay85], where a master agent
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performs scheduling and posts subtasks for slave agents on the blackboard. Such an scheme
is employed by Werkman in his DFI system [J90].
The advantage of this approach lies in its simplicity of implementation and that it is
easy to manage and predict the behavior of participating agents. The master agent can be
made increasingly sophisticated, without losing control of the overall system. One of the key
drawbacks of this technique is its inherent property of central control. It assumes that the
master agent has a global view of the entire agency. It can also result in bottlenecks and
has a central point of failure for the system at the master agent. Durfee et al points out
that such central control mechanisms run against the basic principles of Distributed Artificial
Intelligence (DAI) [DLC89].

2.1.2

Contract based coordination

Contract based coordination was introduced by the Contract Net protocol [Smi80]. One of
the agents assumes a manager role and breaks the problem in subproblems. It then searches
for agents who can bid for the tasks. The agents provide their bids for the given tasks and
the highest bidder is assigned to the task. The manager agent then monitors the problem’s
solution and combines the results from these agents. The bidders can also act as manager
and sub-contract a task to other agents. The Contract Net protocol is typically used in task
allocation problems, however, it can also be used to determine the organization structure of
a system.
The key advantage of contract based coordination is the dynamic task allocation. Also,
the agent organization is not fixed and agents can be added/removed dynamically. The
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Contract Net model also provides a natural load balancing mechanism, as the agents that
are already loaded with lots of tasks might not bid for more tasks. Its major limitation is that
it can only be used in situations where a problem can be neatly subdivided in independent
tasks without any conflicts. Also, it does not attempt to resolve any conflicts between the
tasks of the agents.

2.1.3

Multi-agent planning and shared plans

Multi-agent planning is a coordination technique in which multiple agents exchange their
local plans to come up with a multi-agent plan that provides details of future actions and
interactions to achieve some goal. The plan execution is interleaved with more planning and
replanning.
In a centralized multi-agent planning, one coordinating agent is responsible for gathering
local plans and resolving conflicts in them. The conflict free plans are then executed by
the agents. [Geo88a, Geo88b] provides examples of centralized multi-agent planning where
conflicting interactions are identified and placed in critical regions. This technique suffers
from many of the same problems as the organization based coordination technique: like it has
a central point of failure and the coordinating agent might become a bottleneck. Secondly,
the coordinator agent should be smart enough to understand whole agency model of plans
and come up with a conflict free plan. This requires extensive domain specific knowledge
and might be difficult to scale.
In distributed multi-agent planning, each agent carries a model of every other participating
agent’s plans. Agents communicate with each other to update their local plans and the model
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until all conflicts have been resolved. Partial global planning (PGP) [DL88] and generalized
partial global planning (GPGP) are approaches based on multi-agent distributed planning.
Agents build their local plans and execute them. They share their local plans with each other
to develop partial global plans and improve their local plans by removing any inconsistencies.
Distributed multi-agent planning has several advantages. It can scale well with increased
number of agents. It can also handle dynamic environments where agents might be added
and removed during planning. The drawback is that each agent needs to maintain a model
of the plan of every other agent. If models are not exchanged periodically, this information
can become inconsistent over a period of time.
SharedPlans [GK96] is another approach designed for collaborative actions within a group.
The SharedPlans formalization distinguishes between partial and full plans. A Full SharedPlan is a complete plan in which agents have fully determined how they will perform an
action. A Full SharedPlan model describes the requirements of mutual belief, intentions and
a recipe for the group members. The recipe describes the complete set of actions. A Partial
SharedPlan provides the minimal mental state requirement for the collaboration and gives a
criteria governing the process of completing the plan.

2.1.4

Joint intentions

Joint intentions [LCN90] is a teamwork approach based on the observation of human teamwork. The main idea is that humans working in teams develop joint mental states. So
similarly, for agents to work together, they should form joint intentions towards a goal. The
core of this approach is commitment made by an agent towards other agents and a joint
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persistent goal. Based on this scheme, a cooperative problem solving (CPS) approach was
presented which consists of four stages: recognizing need for teamwork, team formation, plan
formation and team action. This approach was used by [Tam97] to develop a framework for
teamwork called STEAM. The key idea is that it is not possible to predetermine each agents
behavior for teamwork together. So every agent should be provided with a team model that
it can use to reason about whom and how to coordinate with other agents.

2.1.5

Negotiation based coordination

The field of multi-agent negotiation is influenced by economic models, game theory and artificial intelligence. Jennings et. al [JFL01] defines negotiation as a search process where
multiple agents search through the negotiation space to reach agreements and discusses several negotiation models including game theoretic, heuristic based and argumentation based
models. Kraus [Kra01] provides a more in depth study of strategic negotiations in multiagent environments.
Negotiation is also a key technique for coordination. Negotiation can be defined as
in [BM92]:
“...negotiaiton is the communication process of a group of agents to reach a mutually
accepted agreement on some matter.”
What makes negotiation different from other coordination techniques is that it involves
multi-agent decision making. In other techniques, usually a single coordinator agent is responsible for creating a coordination scheme to make the whole set of agents work coherently.
As pointed out in [NLJ96], the distinction between negotiation and some other coordination
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schemes is quite fuzzy. Specially, multi-agent planning comes very close to a negotiation
scheme where multiple agents communicate (negotiate) about their plans and possible conflicts within their plans.
Several negotiation techniques have been devised as pointed out in [NLJ96]. In the following, we shall focus on two such techniques, namely: Game theory and AI based techniques.
Game Theory is a mathematical formulation of cooperative or competitive interaction
between multiple entities. It works towards finding mechanisms that can be used by these
entities to reach a stable solution. Much of game theory work has revolved around payoff
division between these entities after an agreement is reached.
There is growing body of work in this area and originated from the seminal work of
[RZ94]. It provides several mechanisms (in some cases, deception free) for agents to reach
agreements for mutual benefit. [Kra97] provides information on the application domains and
the environments where various game theoretic approaches can be used by agents. [Axe85]
and its sequel [Axe97] detail the complications of cooperation between multiple agents. It
mainly uses prisoner’s dilemma to provide details of intricacies involved in cooperation. It
also provides a computer model of the problem where different strategies are tested for
determining optimal strategy of cooperation.
Several AI based techniques have been used for automated negotiations. In [Syc90] a
general negotiation model is proposed that exploits case based reasoning (CBR). It is based
on the principles that humans negotiate based on previous cases of negotiations. [SF90] views
negotiation as a constraint directed search of the problem space and provide a negotiation
operator that can be used to guide that search. [J90] proposes a knowledge based model of
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an incremental form of negotiation. It sees negotiation as a three phase cycle. In the first
phase, an agent sends a proposal to all other agents. In the second phase, any agent not
content with the proposal might send a counter proposal. If no counter proposal is sent
then proposal is accepted and the negotiations end. In the third phase, the counter proposal
are submitted and an arbitrator agent assists in generating a deadlock free proposal. If the
deadlock can not be resolved, the arbitrator can set some time for agents in the deadlock
to relax their requirements or might use some other predetermined technique to resolve the
conflicts.

2.1.6

Coordination based on physical laws

Another interesting approach for teamwork is based on physical laws. Social Potential Fields
[RW95] is one such mechanism, where individual agents exert different forces on each other
to coordinate their activities. We have used this particular approach for teamwork in our
experiments described in Chapter 3. The main reason for using this approach is that it does
not require a sophisticated model building. The teamwork is based on artificial forces that
can easily be calculated. Also, it does not require any global knowledge of the agent system,
so an agent can perform teamwork with local knowledge of surrounding agents. The details
of this scheme are provided in Section 3.2.1.2.

2.1.7

Collective behavior

Collective behavior refers to social processes and events which emerge in a spontaneous way
and do not reflect existing social structure ( i.e. societal laws and conventions). The crowd
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behvaior in panic like situtations is an example of collective behavior. [BL51, Sme62, TK93]
provide a good introduction to the topic and discuss it in terms of various sociological
perspectives.

2.2

Coalition formation with selfish agents

The teamwork approaches discussed earlier, assumed that a predefined team structure was
already in place. However, there are situations where it is not feasible to have a predefined
team structure. In such situations, the coalition formation process can be used to build
dynamic teams. It is highly applicable in domains where the agents are selfish in nature and
only join a team if it provides better utility. Coalition formation is one of the many ways
that agents can be organized. [HL04] presents a survey of different possible organizations in
a multi-agent environment.

2.2.1

What makes coalition formation interesting?

The coalition formation mechanism is concerned with selecting a subset of agents that can
work together to either work towards a joint goal or to increase their self utility. [Kra97] described several parameters that need to be considered while developing a coalition formation
mechanism.
• Level of cooperation: fully cooperative set of agents working towards the same goal
or selfish agents trying to maximize their own profit. There are intermediary cases
where self-motivated agents join together to work towards a joint goal.
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• Number of agents: can vary in different application from a few agents to hundreds
of agents.
• Level of autonomy: fully autonomous agents or agents with adjustable autonomy.
• Interaction protocols: Some application environments provide agreed upon regulation and interaction protocols while in other environments no such regulations exist.
• Environment: can be static with fixed number of agents or dynamic with varying
number of agents.
The coalition formation process can be viewed as either a single decision maker or multiple
decision maker process.
In single decision maker process, a decision maker agent gets complete knowledge about
the agency and a set of resources/tasks and goal. It can then use an optimization technique
(like optimal task allocation techniques, or Markov Decision Process etc) to build coalitions that should exist to achieve optimal performance. Such task or resource optimization
techniques are a hallmark of Operations Research field.
In multiple decision maker process, each agent is responsible for making its own decisions.
The individual decisions have an impact on the environment and the decision making process
of other agents. This requires techniques from Game Theory to determine an optimal decision
making strategy for each agent.
So, a coalition formation mechanism requires an interdisciplinary approach mainly from
Operations Research and Game Theory. During the past several years, different solutions
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to the coalition formation problem have been proposed by the researchers. In the following
sections, we shall discuss details of these approaches.

2.2.2

Operations research based coalition formation

Operations research usually strives to determine optimal operations of an organization system with given resources (which are usually scarce) [Win87]. Since coalition is an agent
based organization, formal models developed in operations research can be used to devise
optimal coalition structure. These techniques are more widely applicable in application domains where some set of agents have to work towards a joint goal and have some given
set of tasks and resources, like, for example, several workstations working together to fulfil some tasks [MFG88], cooperative shipping companies [FMP95] and manufacturing/shop
floor control activities [BN95]. In [SK95a,SK96], set covering and set partitioning have been
used to devise coalition formation. The problem posed here is to assign a group of drivers
to a set of tasks. The set of drivers are partitioned using techniques from Set Partitioning
Problem (SPP) using Chvatal [Chv79] algorithm. In [SL97], a coalition formation scheme is
presented for distributed vehicle routing problem. The agents are assumed to be computationally bounded, so it looks for an optimal solution under given computational constraints.

2.2.3

Game theory based coalition formation

Game Theory [JO44, Rap70, KR84, Chw94] provides a good notion of several key concepts
which are useful in coalition formation. These concepts include “coalition”, “coalition value”
“payoff mechanism” and “stability”. However , much of the work in game theory has focused
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on how the benefits of a coalition can be distributed among several participants. [Kra97]
points out three issues that should be handled by any coalition formation scheme. These
include, devising an interaction protocol, developing coalition formation algorithm and to address the computational constraints (e.g. communication and computational costs). [RZ94]
discusses several issues for designing interaction protocols for automated negotiations between disparate entities. It applies the general approach and the mathematical tools of
game theory for a formal analysis of interaction protocols. [SK95b] provides a more detailed
account of using game theoretic techniques for coalition formation in “super-additive” environment. In such an environment, all agents are better off forming a grand coalition. The
issue addressed in this paper is that given that a coalition is formed, how should the pay off
be divided among different members of the coalition. [KG02] provides a detailed account of
existing coalition formation schemes (for static environments) and how can they be extended
for a dynamic environment. It concerns itself with dynamic environment where the agents,
their interconnections and the set of tasks can change dynamically. It describes “DCF-A”
algorithm which can be used to form coalitions in such dynamic environments. In [KST03],
a coalition formation scheme is presented for Request for Proposal (RFP) domain. It assumes that each agent knows about other agents capabilities, but does not necessarily know
the value assigned to each task by that agent. The agents then form coalitions under such
uncertain environment. [CB04] also presents a coalition formation model under uncertain
environment. In this case, the value of coalition and the value of tasks for each agent might
be uncertain and can be learned in repeated interactions. It provides a bayesian reinforcement learning based model where agents can assign uncertain values to different coalitions.
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It also introduces the concept of “bayesian core” as the stability factor within such coalition.

2.2.4

Other approaches for coalition formation

[GL03] presents a coalition formation mechanism based on motivation and trust. It relates
to the emotional part of intelligent agent. Motivation derives the overall objective of the
agent, while trust drives its willingness to form coalition with old or new agents. This work
can be related with group formation and group behavior in social sciences.
[DB04] discuss the impact of heterogeneous agents in coalition formation schemes. The
diversity of agents is termed essential for finding coalitions that provide benefit to all participating agents and presents diverse solutions to a given problem. In [MW04], the concept of
iterative coalition formation is introduced. The agents keep changing their coalitions based
on current available set of agents and coalitions. It experimented with different coalition
change strategies ranging from “random” to “stay if win in one of the last two coalition
formation rounds”.

2.3

Agent teamwork and coalition formation in the physical world

As described in the previous section, much of existing work toward teamwork has been done
in formalizing theoretical models, interaction mechanisms and algorithms. There has been
relatively little effort towards applying these models for agents residing in the physical world.
In the following, we focus on some of the research work performed in this domain.
[CF02] provides details of using teamwork in ubiquitous environment (i.e. environments
with embedded devices). It adapts the joint intention teamwork model with the extension
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provided by [WJ94]. It points out some problems with using this theoretical teamwork model
in the embedded devices. It points out three major problems:
• Perception limitation, which cause the devices to have limited perception range
within a given environment. So the assumption of available global knowledge about
the system can not be used in embedded devices
• Planning limitation is caused by scarce computational resources of the embedded
devices. Also, planning usually requires global knowledge about the system, which can
not be assumed for these devices
• Mobility causes the ad-hoc nature of teamwork in embedded devices. The device
mobility requires the teamwork infrastructure to be flexible enough to handle dynamic
nature of their existence.
RoboCup [Rob] and RoboCup Rescue [Kit00] provide a platforms for building teamwork
and coalition formation approaches for physical world agents. In RoboCup, different teams
of agents are formed that can play soccer against each other. It has been studied from several
perspectives including computer vision, control theory, individual and team behavior etc. In
RoboCup Rescue, the agents are designed to operate in a disaster struck area.
[EAK07] discusses the problem of generating patrol paths for a team of mobile robots
inside a target area under frequency constraints. It describes an algorithm that assigns
locations to the robots along the path such that patrolling from those locations create a
uniform maximal-frequency patrol.
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There has been some work in intelligent transportation systems to incorporate teamwork
among vehicles on a highways based on vehicle control system like in [PAT] or based on
computer vision techniques [SNW95]. However, much of that work revolved around vehicle control system rather than inter-vehicle coordination. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) is working on mobile agents that can perform teamwork with humans [BSA02]. One of the system being designed is the Personal Satellite Assistant (PSA),
a softball-sized flying robot that could operate onboard a spacecraft in micro-gravity environment [GBW00]. It could navigate through spacecraft areas which are usually difficult to
access by humans. Another kind of agent is Robonaut, which is a robot with torso, head,
arms, five fingered hand and a flying spherical eye. It is being designed to be used outside
ISS in multi-robot and multi-person scenarios. The key difference between these agents and
earlier robotic work is the idea of adjustable autonomy. Their basic function will be to work
as an associate or assistant to a human being rather than the traditional ones which just
execute some given commands.
Institute for Simulation and Training (IST) is also working on several defense related
projects for teamwork between ground based vehicles or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
to coordinate their movements in a given terrain and under several constraints.
Coalition formation between agent residing in the physical world has been the object
of study of collaborative robotics. One such effort is the DARPA Software for Distributed
Robotics (SDR) program where researchers from SRI International, Stanford University,
the University of Washington, and ActivMedia Robotics are designing and implementing a
computational framework for the coordination of large robot teams, consisting of at least
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100 small, resource limited mobile robots (CentiBOTS) on an indoor reconnaissance task.
Alami et al [AFH97] presents a scheme of operating a large number of mobile robots using
plan merging paradigm. Their scheme is based on local knowledge and incremental planning
in a distributed manner. They attempt to resolve the spatial movement conflicts between
mobile robots.
Although team formation is frequently considered a centralized activity, where a manager
assembles teams based on optimization criteria, several research efforts have dealt with negotiation based team formation models. The DARPA Autonomous Negotiating Teams (ANTS)
program was one of the focus points of this effort. Some of these papers are concerned with a
multi sensor target tracking problem [ST01,MLH03]. Sariel and Balch [SB05] use an auction
based approach for task allocation in multiple robot map exploration problem. The negotiation schemes in the physical world have to be time constrained. [KWZ95] provides a good
introduction on this topic. Crawford and Veloso [CV04] discuss a domain in which multiple
agent agree on a given time slot for a meeting, under static or dynamic user preferences. The
CoAX - Coalition Agents Experiment series demonstrated the utility of agent technology for
coalition operations in a series of technology integration experiments [ABB02, ABK03].

2.4

Embedded devices and small scale computers

Embedded devices are increasingly becoming part of computing landscape. They are part of
our vehicular navigation system, microwave ovens, alarm systems, traffic signalling, air traffic
control systems, aircraft control systems and so on. It is a very vast area of research and it
will not be possible for us to survey this field in its entirety in this dissertation. We shall
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therefore provide some useful reference of related papers and focus on the embedded devices
that we have used in our research work. The idea of “embodied agents” has been around since
quite a while now. The use of software agents in embedded devices has been sought from
different perspective including “ubiquitous computing” and “pervasive computing”. [FJK01]
provides information about many such efforts.
Many kinds of embedded devices are usually available in the market ranging from fully
functional devices like micro controllers to small scale devices like motes [PSS04]. Motes are
tiny computing devices with wireless networking capability and several sensors. The sensors
can be used to sense temperature, pressure or light. The radio communication usually takes
place within a given range (the range depends upon the model used). There is no external
interface available for these motes other than some LEDs that can be used to signal current state of the mote. Motes have a small footprint operating system called TinyOS [Tin].
It provides support for a programming environment and the nesC [GLB03] programming
language. nesC resembles the syntax of the C language, while providing additional capabilities in the context of the TinyOS system, such as managing concurrency and promoting
the use of components. Many low level functions, like sending packets to the serial port,
radio communication or radio range specification have a component-based implementation.
The TinyOS system also provides the TOSSIM simulation environment which allows to debug the applications on a desktop system before deploying it on motes. Motes have been
used in lot of applications and continue to be a driving force for a large number of research
community. [wor] provides a good reference of existing projects that have used motes.
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CHAPTER 3
EMBODIED AGENT APPLICATION: CONVOY DRIVING IN ONE
DIMENSIONAL WORLD

In this chapter, we discuss the problem of convoy formation in one dimensional physical
world. Our example application concerns the case of cars spontaneously forming convoys on
a single lane highway. While the one-dimensional environment simplifies the problem in the
sense that no path planning is necessary, in other respects the problem exhibits most of the
characteristics and challenges of the convoy formation in the physical world. The cars need
to balance their interests and their commitment to the convoy. Convoys are dynamically
formed and disassembled, and physical constraints such as the limited transmission range of
the cars’ wireless devices and the limitations in terms of the velocity of the cars need to be
considered.

3.1

Convoy driving on a public highway

The spontaneous formation of convoys on a public highway makes driving safer, increases the
throughput of the highway and decreases travel time. As highway traffic is often modeled
by analogies with fluid dynamics [BD02], in this language convoy driving corresponds to a
flow without turbulence.
While the formation of convoys is sometimes an explicitly planned operation, most often
it is happening in an ad hoc manner between vehicles whose drivers do not know each other,
might not have common goals and can communicate only through indirect means. Convoys
are formed and terminated dynamically; their life cycle ranges from tens of seconds to several
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hours. Vehicles can join and leave, and convoys themselves can split and merge.
If we consider the vehicles governed by intelligent agents, highway convoy driving is a
microcosm of problems including communication (both at networking and semantic level),
team formation, leader election, negotiation and planning. Highway driving being a one
dimensional problem, it allows us to test our solutions in a simplified yet real world setting.
The algorithms developed for this one dimensional environment can then be extended to two
dimensions (for example, unmanned ground vehicles) and three dimensions (e.g. unmanned
aerial vehicles). However, far from being a toy problem, convoy formation in highway driving
is an economically important problem on its own and presents specific challenges not present
in the two or three dimensional case, such as the difficulty to overtake vehicles or the influence
of traffic signs.
In this chapter, we present a set of algorithms which facilitate convoy formation on the
highway. To assume that highway vehicles are completely under agent control is unrealistic
at this stage of the technology. Therefore, we consider the vehicles to be controlled by the
human driver who is assisted by an additional “convoy driving device” (CDD). The CDD
is a hardware device, with limited computational power and low power wireless communication abilities. We assume that it can read the speed of the vehicle, and it might be able
to determine the distance from the vehicle in front. Its output is an “accelerate” or “decelerate” message, which is conveyed to the driver through visual means. We can envision
implementations in which these signals are connected to the “increase speed” / “decrease
speed” controls of the cruise control of the vehicle, which is the case of the Adaptive Cruise
Control devices proposed by some auto makers.
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The CDD-s are communicating with each other, and decide on the formation of a convoy
based on a variety of factors such as the current speed of the vehicles, the desired speed,
the limitations of the vehicles and highway speed limits. The vehicles need to agree on the
common speed of the convoy, and need to adjust their own speed accordingly. It is desirable
that the vehicles maintain a uniform following distance. The algorithms also need to handle
the specific events in the life cycle of the convoy: vehicles joining and leaving the convoy,
convoys with different speeds passing by each other, the vehicles in the convoy separating in
two different convoys with different speeds or two convoys merging into a single one.
We have built a prototype implementation of the CDD using Crossbow Mica2 “motes”,
which are tiny, self-contained, battery powered computers with sensor and wireless capabilities [PSS04]. We need to emphasize however, that a commercial implementation of a
CDD would likely use hardware with different characteristics, potentially more powerful and
better integrated with the rest of the on-board electronics.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains our convoy
formation approach, the algorithms used for convoy formation and the evaluation of the
relative utility of convoys. Section 3.3 discusses the hardware implementation of the Convoy
Driving Device based on the mote architecture. Section 3.4 describes a simulation study
which studies the impact of the proposed convoy driving algorithms on the driving dynamics
of a highway with a large number of vehicles.
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3.2

Convoy formation algorithms

Let us consider a set of vehicles V = {v1 , v2 , ..., vn } moving in the same direction on a
highway. We call a convoy C ⊆ V , a set of vehicles which are moving with a coordinated
speed and in close proximity to each other.
A convoy can be formed through either a centralized or a distributed approach. In the
centralized approach, a convoy leader defines the structure and parameters of the convoy
based on global knowledge of the capabilities and preferences of the potential convoy members. This requires an appropriate networking and data collection infrastructure. As many
convoys can be significantly larger than the range of available wireless communication, the
participating nodes need to setup either a vehicle-to-vehicle ad hoc network, for instance,
based on the emerging standards such as DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communications),
or a vehicle-to-infrastructure network. Such a roadside wireless infrastructure is not going to
be available for at least several more years. In addition, the drivers of the vehicles might not
agree on delegating their decision to join a convoy to a central authority or another vehicle.
In the distributed approach, nodes autonomously decide which convoy to join based on
local information. The overall convoy structure emerges from these individual decisions.
Although it still requires vehicle-to-vehicle communication for gathering local information or
communicating decisions and desires, all the communication remains in the one-hop wireless
communication range from the vehicle. As decisions are made only based on information
received from the several neighboring vehicles and the vehicles own capabilities and preferences, the approach is readily scalable.
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The question which remains is whether an efficient and stable traffic pattern can be
obtained with the distributed convoy formation approach. In the following, we describe our
overall approach for distributed convoy formation and discuss several possible choices for the
ways in which the individual vehicles can influence the speed of the convoy. An experimental
study of these approaches is described in Section 3.4.

3.2.1

Convoy formation process

The simplest way to create a convoy is for every vehicle to adopt the speed of the vehicle
in front of it. For example the Adaptive Cruise Control systems tested by various vehicle
manufacturers are working in this manner. This approach however, has several drawbacks.
The speed of the convoy will be dictated by its slowest member. If a vehicle decides to go
slower than the vehicle in front, it will lead to the splitting of the convoy, as the vehicles
coming after will reduce their speed as well. The vehicles in the convoy have no means to
influence the speed of the convoy. For instance, if they want to go faster, their only choice
is to leave the convoy and overtake all the vehicles ahead of them.
By allowing the agents controlling the vehicles to perform local communication, our goal
is to create convoys which reflect the preferences of their participants and thus result in
reduced number of vehicles leaving the convoy. There are three different aspects of the
participation of a vehicle in a convoy.
• The decision to join or leave the convoy. The vehicle can join any convoy in its
physical proximity, or it can decide to drive outside of any convoy. For the sake of a
uniform treatment, we will consider the later as the vehicle forming its own convoy.
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These decisions are based on the vehicle evaluating the utility of the convoy and at the
same time considering the costs associated with joining and leaving the convoys. The
utility of a convoy depends on the preferences and capabilities of the vehicle, as well
as the speed, following distance and other parameters of the convoy. The utility can
vary in time as these parameters change.
• The influence of the convoy on the vehicle. Once the vehicle has joined the
convoy, its driving is influenced by the presence of the other vehicles in the convoy.
Most importantly, its speed needs to be synchronized with the speed of the other
vehicles. Small, temporary adjustments in speed can be used to achieve the desired
following distance / time gap between the vehicles.
• The influence of the vehicle on the convoy. The vehicle should be able to influence
the parameters of the convoy such as speed and following distance through a process
of negotiating with the other agents participating in the convoy.
The agent contains two independent components to accomplish these goals. The periodic
evaluation component (Figure 3.1) continuously evaluates the utility of potential convoys by
generating potential offers for the neighboring vehicles. The convoy join decision component
(Figure 3.2) is responsible for making decisions about which convoys will the agent join
or leave based on “offered” convoys. These two components operate continuously and in
parallel, such that the convoy joining decisions are always made based on the latest available
data.
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Wait for periodic evaluation time
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speed of the neighborhood vehicles
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Influence convoy
members

Yes

Figure 3.1: Convoy formation: Periodic evaluation component of the agent
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Influence convoy
members

Figure 3.2: Convoy formation: Convoy join decision component of the agent
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Table 3.1: The notations used to describe the convoy formation algorithm
Notation
Description
Vi
a vehicle i
Ci
convoy identifier for vehicle Vi
Pi
current speed of vehicle Vi
Di
desired speed of vehicle Vi
Hi
Upper speed limit for vehicle Vi
Li
Lower speed limit for vehicle Vi
Ni
set of vehicles in the neighborhood of vehicle Vi
Oij < Ci , Si > offer made by vehicle Vi to vehicle Vj
consisting of convoy identifier of vehicle Vi and
the offered speed Si
U (Vi , Oij )
utility of offer Oij for vehicle Vi
U (Vi )
current utility of vehicle Vi
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for periodic evaluation
While true
WaitForPeriodicEvaluationTime()
for each vehicle Vj ∈ Ni
Oij < Ci , Si > ← DetermineOfferBasedOnInfluenceMechanism()
U (Vi , Oij ) ← DetermineUtility(Pi , Di , Si )
If U (Vi , Oij ) ≥ U (Vi ) then
accepted ← sendJoinOffer(Vj , Oij < Ci , Si >)
If accepted = true then
Pi ← Si
U (Vi ) ← U (Vi , Oij )
InfluenceConvoy(Ci , Pi )
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for convoy joining
Oij < Ci , Si > ← receiveJoinOffer()
If Ci > 0 then
If Ci = Cj then return
U (Vj , Oij ) ← DetermineUtility(Pj , Dj , Si )
If U (Vj , Oij ) > U (Vj ) then
sendJoinAccept(Vi , Oij < Ci , Si >)
Cj ← Ci
Pj ← Si
U (Vj ) ← U (Vj , Oij )
InfluenceConvoy(Cj , Pj )

Before discussing these algorithms in detail, we need to introduce several notations as
shown in Table 3.1.
Each convoy is identified by a unique positive convoy identifier. Every vehicle maintains
an up-to-date list of vehicles in its communication range. This is achieved by every vehicle
periodically broadcasting its identifier.
In the periodic evaluation algorithm, each vehicle will periodically evaluate the utility
of potential convoys by generating potential offers for the vehicles in its neighborhood. An
offer Oij < Ci , Si > generated by vehicle Vi for vehicle Vj consists of the current convoy
identifier of vehicle Vi and the offered speed Si . The offered speed varies based on the
influence mechanism used by the vehicles. Several influence mechanisms are discussed in
Section 3.2.1.2. The vehicle then determines the utility of the offer U (Vi , Oij ). The process of
utility determination is explained in Section 3.2.1.1. If the offer provides a better utility than
its current utility (i.e. U (Vi , Oij ) ≥ U (Vi )), it sends the offer to the neighboring vehicle Vj .
If the neighboring vehicle accepts the offer, the vehicle adapts the offered speed and notifies
its convoy members about the update using a hop-to-hop communication mechanism.
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The convoy join decision algorithm is performed whenever the vehicle Vj receives a convoy
join offer Oij < Ci , Si > from some neighboring vehicle Vi . The vehicle ignores the offer if it
is already part of the convoy Ci . Otherwise, it determines the utility of the offer U (Vj , Oij ).
If the utility of the offer is greater than its current utility, the vehicle accepts the offer and
sends a join acceptance message to the vehicle Vi . The vehicle Vj updates its current speed
and convoy identifier to reflect the changes required to join the offered convoy, and notifies
other members of the convoy about the update.
The details of the utility determination and the influences between convoy members are
presented in the following sections.

3.2.1.1

Determining the utility of a convoy

The utility of participating in a convoy depends on the goals of the driver. For example,
if the prevailing goal is safety, the driver will participate in any convoy, provided that it is
moving slower than the speed limit. If the goal is the fastest possible travelling speed, the
vehicle will not join any existing convoy. However, a new convoy might form from vehicles
following the given vehicle.
Different vehicles can have different utility functions even if they are part of the same
convoy. Vehicles in a convoy, however, need to agree on the same rules for evaluating
influences, otherwise the integrity of the convoy can not be maintained.
It is desirable to have a utility function which maintains a balance between the interests
and the commitments of a vehicle. Another requirement is that the utility function returns 0
for offers which are not feasible (for instance because they require a speed which the vehicle
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can not reach). One simple function which satisfies this requirement is the following:

U (Vj , Oij ) =




 1−

|Dj −Si |
Dj

−λ×



 0

|Pj −Si |
Pj

if Lj ≤ Si ≤ Hj
otherwise

Note that any offered speed that lies outside the lower and upper speed limits has zero
utility. Otherwise, the utility of an offered speed is affected by two factors. The compromise
factor

|Dj −Si |
Dj

determines the amount of compromise that the vehicle need to make to become

part of the convoy. It increases with the difference between the desired and the offered speed
of the vehicle. Thus, an offered speed that is either higher or lower than the desired speed,
will cause the utility of the offer to become lower. The join cost factor λ ×

|Pj −Si |
Pj

is the

cost of joining convoy Ci , and it is zero if Vj is either currently a member of the convoy or
if the offered speed matches the current speed of the vehicle. This factor reflects the need
to accelerate or decelerate to join a convoy. In addition, this factor allows us to introduce
“friction” in the behavior of the vehicles. By making it expensive for a vehicle to leave a
convoy, we can reduce the number of defections and stabilize the convoys. Experimentally,
we found λ = 0.1 to be an adequate value.

3.2.1.2

Influences among the members of the convoy

Joining a convoy is not a purely logical operation. The vehicles in the convoy are reciprocally
influencing each others’ road behavior such that they are maintaining the desired formation.
The input of these influences are the data collected by the CDDs. Remarkably, stable
convoys can be formed by knowing only the speed of the current vehicle, but better control
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can be maintained if the agent also has access to the distance of the neighboring vehicles.
A single such measurement, such as the distance from the vehicle in front, is in practice
sufficient. This measurement can come from a radar device, or it can be inferred from the
measurement of power of the wireless signal. The power of the wireless signal is, however,
strongly dependent on the environment and needs to be used carefully.
In the following we discuss three influence strategies we tested.
Influence Strategy ASL (Adjusting to the speed of the leader): In this case, the
front vehicle of the convoy is considered the leader, and all the other vehicles in the convoy
are adapting their speed to it. The advantage of this approach is that the convoys are formed
quickly and they do not require distance measurement, nor additional negotiation. When a
new vehicle joins the convoy, the speed of the convoy remains unchanged. The disadvantage
is that the speed of the convoy is dictated by its slowest vehicle, the only other choice of
the member vehicles being to leave the convoy. This influence strategy alone is not able to
adjust the following distances, although in a practical deployment the driver can intervene
through manual control if the vehicles come dangerously close to each other. The utility
of the convoy remains the same for a vehicle throughout the lifetime of the convoy. This
increases the stability of the convoy. The only reason for a vehicle to reconsider its convoy
joining decision is if the convoy passes next to another convoy with a higher utility for the
particular vehicle.
Influence Strategy AVG (Average desired speed): In this case, the vehicles in the
convoy adjust their speed to the average desired speed of the members. In general, this leads
to a higher average utility of the convoy. One disadvantage, however is that the speed of the
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convoy changes whenever vehicles join or leave the convoy. The change in convoy speed also
changes the utility of the convoy for individual vehicles. This might change the individual
vehicle’s decision to whether stay in the convoy or not. The AVG influence strategy, similarly
to the ASL strategy, does not require distance information and does not provide a mechanism
for regulating inter-vehicle distances.
Influence Strategy SPF (Social potential fields): Social potential fields [RW95] are
a distributed behavior control scheme based on the idea of applying artificial forces among
agents to keep them in group formation. In a social potential field, we have an artificial force
between each pair of agents which can be described as the sum of an attractive and repulsive
component, both being inverse polynomial with the distance. The movement of the vehicle
is determined by the sum of the forces acting on the vehicle. The formula we used for the
force between two vehicles is:

F (r) =

−c1
c2
+ a2 where c1 , c2 ≥ 0, a1 > a2 > 0
a
1
r
r

(3.1)

We assume that the forces are active only between the vehicles which are part of the
same convoy and in communication range of each other. Although more complex than the
previous approaches, the influence strategy based on social potential fields has the following
advantages:
• The convoy speed is dependent on the force parameters and can be adjusted using the
parameters c1 , c2 , a1 and a2 . In our simulations, we have adjusted these parameters to
attain a convoy speed slightly higher than the average speed of the vehicles.
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• The influence mechanism is able to regulate the inter-vehicle distance in the convoy.
• The influence mechanism does not suggest abrupt changes in the speed of the vehicles.
As the forces are dependent on the distance, the SPF influence strategy requires the
existence of distance measurements.

3.3

Implementation

We developed a prototype implementation of the CDD based on the Mica2 Mote Development Kit, running the TinyOS [Tin] programming environment and the nesC [GLB03]
programming language.
Our experimental setup consisted of a desktop PC and four MICA2 motes. The desktop
PC was used to develop the applications and simulate them with different number of nodes.
The application was uploaded to the motes through an interface board connected to the PC
via serial cable. We found that the processing power of the motes is sufficient for the task
and the only input/output problems encountered were the limited user interface features of
the motes. The only user interface features are the three onboard LEDs. We used them to
indicate whether the speed of the vehicle should increase or decrease, and left to the driver
to adjust the cruise control system accordingly.
Figure 3.3 shows the components used in the implementation of our application. The
SingleTimer component was used to invoke periodic timer events. The RadioCRCPacket
component was used to send and receive packets over radio communication and it used
UARTFramedPacket component to send packets over UART. It also used the RandomLFSR
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component to generate random numbers (e.g. for convoy identifier) and the LedsC component
to handle LEDs.

Figure 3.3: Component diagram for convoy driving device application

Each mote was initialized with a fixed node identifier and the current speed of the vehicle.
They were programmed to periodically broadcast their node identifier, convoy identifier
and current speed to all neighboring nodes. This broadcast took place every 100 msec.
The broadcast range was fixed using CC1000Control interface provided by RadioCRCPacket
component.
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The motes periodically generated offers using the selected influence mechanism and
broadcasted it. While listening to incoming messages, each mote decided whether to join
a convoy or not based on the utility function. If the new speed required acceleration, it
turned on the red LED, while if breaking was required it turned on the yellow LED. If the
current speed was equal to the convoys’ adopted speed, the green LED was blinking. The
current speed was sent over UART so that it could be inspected on attached PC via serial
port. Figure 3.4 shows the deployed mote placed at the dashboard of the car as it is used to
increase or decrease the speed based on the indication from the LEDs.

Figure 3.4: Mote blinking to advise change in speed

3.4

Simulation study

In the following, we describe the results of a series of simulation studies which model the
traffic on a road where every vehicle is assumed to be controlled by a CDD. The behavior of
the vehicles can be studied at microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic levels. Microscopic,
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mesoscopic and macroscopic traffic simulation are the accepted terms in the field of traffic
flow modeling. The definitions of these levels are:
• Microscopic level: when vehicles are considered as individuals. We are interested in
metrics such as velocity of individual vehicle, inter-vehicle distance and so on.
• Mesoscopic (kinetic) scale: an intermediate possibility, is to define a function
f(t,x,V) which expresses the probability of having a vehicle at time t in position x
which runs with velocity V. This function, following methods of statistical mechanics,
can be computed solving an integro-differential equation, like the Boltzmann Equation.
• Macroscopic level: when we are interested in developing laws for some cumulative
quantities of interest, e.g. the density of vehicles or their mean velocity.
In our simulations, we are interested in the behavior of the vehicles at two levels:
a) The microscopic behavior of the vehicles inside a convoy. We are interested in the
relative position, the inter-vehicle distance and the speed changes necessary to join and
maintain a convoy.
b) The macroscopic behavior of the vehicles. Assuming a long stretch of straight road
with a large number of vehicles with a mix of desired speeds, we are interested in the number
of convoys formed, the distribution of their size and speed, as well as how close is the speed
of the convoys to the desired speed of the participating vehicles. As the safety of the traffic
on a highway is inversely correlated with the number of overtakings, we also measure the
number of overtakings under various assumptions.
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Table 3.2: Highway configuration with small number of vehicles
Simulation parameter
Value
Highway length
1 km
Number of vehicles
5
Communication range
50m
Vehicle configuration
ID Position Speed(m/s)
1
800
20
2
600
28
3
400
25
4
200
32
5
0
35
For both studies, we collected data for the three proposed influence algorithms (ASL,
AVG and SPF).
The simulation was implemented in the Java based Yet Another Extensible Simulator
(YAES) [BT05] framework.

3.4.1

Comparison of convoy formation approaches at microscopic scale

In the following simulation runs we are comparing the three choices for the influence mechanisms at microscopic scale with traffic conditions shown in Table 3.2. To restrict the test only
to the influence mechanism, we changed the join decision mechanism such that all vehicles
in the test formed a single convoy. We also assumed that the five vehicles participating in
the convoy are the only vehicles on the road. In our simulations we assumed the range of
the wireless transmitter to be 50 meters.
For each simulation, we recorded the evolution of the speed and position of each vehicle.
To achieve a better visualization of the configuration of the convoy, our position graphs
represent the relative position of the vehicles in relation to the last vehicle. The dashed lines
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of the position graph represent the relative positions where the vehicles would be without the
convoy algorithms. The reason for this visualization approach is the fact that the relative
movements of the vehicles are small compared with their common longitudinal movement,
which would tend to dominate the absolute position plot.
Figure 3.5 shows the results of ASL algorithm. We find that with this algorithm vehicles
form convoys as soon as they enter each other’s communication range. It is also important
to note the radical speed changes which the vehicles need to make to join the convoy, and
the fact that the final speed of the convoy is the speed of the slowest vehicle.
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Figure 3.5: Convoy formation with the ASL influence mechanism. Top: relative position
of the vehicles with respect to Vehicle-5. Black lines: the position of the vehicles with the
convoy formation mechanism working. Gray lines: the position of the vehicles without the
convoy formation mechanism. Bottom: the speed of the vehicles. Note the abrupt change
in speed associated with the convoy joining decisions.
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Figure 3.6 shows the results of the AVG influence algorithm. As expected, the speed
changes are smaller in this case and they can be either acceleration or deceleration depending
on whether the vehicle is faster or slower than the convoy. The vehicles in the convoy need
to change speed every time a new vehicle joins the convoy. For instance, Vehicle-3 needs to
go through two steps of speed increase followed by a step of speed decrease. The relative
distance between vehicles, just like the previous case, is stabilizing around the maximum
transmission range (i.e. 50 m), as the vehicles quickly form convoys as they enter each
others communication range and agree upon average speed. As our simulation does not
model the inevitable errors and fluctuations of the transmission range, the relative distance
graph looks much smoother in this diagram than it would be in reality.
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Figure 3.6: Convoy formation with the AVG influence mechanism. Top: relative position
of the vehicles with respect to Vehicle-5. Black lines: the position of the vehicles with the
convoy formation mechanism working. Gray lines: the position of the vehicles without the
convoy formation mechanism. Bottom: the speed of the vehicles. The change in speed are
smaller than in the case of ASL approach, but the speed of the vehicles already in the convoy
changes every time a new vehicle joins the convoy.
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Figure 3.7 shows the results of SPF influence algorithm. The parameters of the social
potential field forces are set to achieve the speed slightly higher than the average speed of
the vehicles. The faster vehicle approaching a slower vehicle exerts a positive force causing
it to accelerate while the slower vehicle exerts a negative force on the faster vehicle, causing
it to slow down. Since the distance information is available, it can be used to maintain a
required inter vehicle distance. In this simulation a distance of approximately 25 meters
is maintained. Also, the resulting speed can then be attained gradually by translating the
forces into an acceleration and deceleration of respective vehicles.
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Figure 3.7: Convoy formation with the SPF influence mechanism. Top: relative position
of the vehicles with respect to Vehicle-5. Black lines: the position of the vehicles with the
convoy formation mechanism working. Gray lines: the position of the vehicles without the
convoy formation mechanism. Bottom: the speed of the vehicles. The approach shows a
more smooth gradual change of speed.
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Table 3.3: Highway configuration used for the simulation
Simulation parameter
Value
Highway length
60 kilometer
Number of vehicles
100-900 vehicles
Vehicle initial speed
Uniformly distributed between 10m/s to 40m/s
Vehicle desired speed
Uniformly distributed between the vehicle’s initial
speed to 40m/s
Vehicle communication range 50m
3.4.2

Comparison of convoy formation approaches at macroscopic scale

In the second series of experiments we are interested in the evolution of the traffic at a
macroscopic scale. For these experiments, we considered 60km long stretch of the highway
with hundreds of vehicles. We assume that each vehicle has a CDD device and uses the
same influence mechanism. However, the initial and desired speed of the vehicles vary. The
parameters of the simulation are listed in Table 3.3
The simulation was run multiple times with various density of the vehicles (i.e. increased
number of vehicles per km of highway). The data was collected by observing the traffic
conditions for 600 seconds. The simulations was repeated 100 times with random initial
conditions and the average values and the 95% confidence intervals were calculated.
In these simulations, we consider a single vehicle as a convoy consisting of only one
member. Also, to maintain the autonomy of the vehicles, each vehicle of the convoy would
independently interact with other vehicles of the neighboring convoys to decide whether they
should form a convoy. If two vehicles belonging to different convoys agreed to form a convoy,
all the member vehicles of the convoy represented by these vehicles would implicitly join this
new convoy. This simplistic assumption helped us in maintaining stable convoy structures
in the presence of limited communication range of the convoy members. This model can
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be extended in various ways including convoy joining by majority vote or the convoy leader
making decisions on behalf of the entire convoy based on some aggregate function of the
desired speeds of the individual vehicles etc.

3.4.2.1

Number of convoys formed

Figure 3.8 shows the number of convoys as a function of the density of the vehicles on the
highway. As expected, the number of convoys increases approximately linearly with the
density of the vehicles for all three influence mechanisms. But ASL has the largest number
of convoys as well as the highest increment with the density of the vehicles, followed by AVG
and SPF.
How do we interpret these results? Other conditions being equal, we prefer environments
with a lower number of convoys of larger size. However, these results can not be interpreted
in isolation, as it is also important to consider how well the speed of the convoy reflects the
desires of the vehicles. For instance, a large convoy moving at the speed limit is desired,
where as a convoy formed of vehicles stuck behind a slow moving vehicle is not.
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Figure 3.8: The number of convoys as a function of the density of the vehicles on the
highway. The number of convoys formed increase with the density of the vehicles. The ASL
and AVG approaches result in large number of convoys. The SPF approach results in the
lowest number of convoys.
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3.4.2.2

Distribution of convoy sizes

Figure 3.9 shows the distribution of the convoy sizes after the elapse of 600 seconds of
simulation using 900 vehicles. As the size of the convoys ranges from 1 to 110, for sizes
above 10 vehicles we have clustered them in groups of sizes 11-30, 31-50, 51-70, 71-90 and
91-110. The graph shows a remarkable difference in the distribution of convoy size among
the three influence mechanisms.

For the ASL influence mechanism, the most frequent case is convoys of size 1 (i.e. vehicles
which are not part of any convoy), followed by convoys of 2 and 3 vehicles. From here, the
number of convoys continues to drop very quickly. There were no convoys of 10 vehicles or
more formed with the ASL influence mechanism.

For the AVG approach, the largest number of convoys had the size of 2 vehicles, followed
by 3, 4 and finally 1 vehicle. The AVG approach allowed the occasional formation of larger
convoys as well, up to the 31-50 vehicle range.

Finally, the SPF approach also shows the largest number of convoys consisting of 2 and
3 vehicles. However, the SPF influence mechanism allowed the creation of several very large
convoys, up to the 90-110 vehicle range (naturally, as there are only 900 vehicles in the
experiment, there can not be a very large number of convoys of this size).

The conclusion of this experiment is that every influence mechanism produces a different
distribution of the convoy sizes. The ASL mechanism favors small convoys or even individual
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vehicles (note that our experiments did not model ”convoys by necessity” where vehicles get
stuck behind a slow moving vehicle). The AVG and SPF mechanisms prefer larger convoys
with 2-4 vehicles, with an occasional larger convoy of up to 50 vehicles for AVG and up to
110 vehicles for the SPF.
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of the convoy sizes using a simulation involving 900 vehicles. The
ASL approach results in large number of convoys consisting of single or very few vehicles.
The AVG approach results in a variety of convoy sizes. There are significant number of
convoys of smaller sizes while there exist some convoys of significantly larger sizes (including
some that consist of 31 to 50 vehicles). The SPF approach results in a relatively fewer
number of smaller convoys and some considerably larger sized convoys (a couple of them
consisting of 51 to 100 vehicles).
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3.4.2.3

Distribution of convoy speed

Figure 3.10 shows the distribution of the convoy speed at the end of 600 seconds of simulation
using 900 vehicles. For better visualization, we have clustered the convoys, in the speed
ranges of 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40-44 (m/s).
For a correct interpretation of this data, we do not consider aspects of the highway traffic
such as speed limits, or the risks of high speed driving. Under these assumptions, the higher
the average speed of the vehicles, the better for the traffic.
With the ASL influence mechanism, the highest percentage of convoys are moving at
the very slow speed of 10-14 m/s, followed by a smaller and smaller percentage of convoys
moving at higher speed. A very minute percentage of convoys move at speed 30 m/s or
higher.
With the AVG influence mechanism, the highest percentage of convoys are moving at
the speed of 25-29 m/s, followed by the convoys moving at speed 20-24 m/s and then 30-34
m/s. A very small percentage of convoys move at the slow speed of 10-14 m/s or the highest
speed of 35-39 m/s.
And finally, with SPF influence mechanism, the highest percentage of convoys are moving
at the speed of 25-29 m/s, followed by a considerably large percentage of the convoys moving
at the speed of 30-34 m/s.
So, the ASL mechanism favors convoys moving at very slow speed while both AVG and
SPF approach favor faster moving convoys. The percentage of convoys moving at the speed
of 25m/s or higher is largest with the SPF mechanism.
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of the convoy speed using a simulation involving 900 vehicles.
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3.4.2.4

Average difference between measured and desired speed of the vehicles

From the point of view of the individual vehicle, the ideal driving environment is one in which
the vehicle is alone on the road. In this situation, a vehicle would simply drive at its desired
speed. When sharing the road with other vehicles, the agent might either form convoys, or
attempt to achieve its desired speed by overtaking all the slower vehicles, irrespectively of
the speed difference. On most roads, the act of overtaking in itself involves a certain amount
of delay. Furthermore, a traffic environment where every vehicle is attempting to overtake
all slower vehicles becomes highly chaotic and unsafe. On the other hand, convoy driving
requires the vehicle to adjust its speed to the convoy, thus renouncing to its desired speed
in exchange for the safety and predictability of convoy driving. In general, the lower the
difference between the desired speed of the vehicle and the actual speed of the convoy, the
better the convoy formation model is.
Figure 3.11 shows the average difference between the vehicles’ measured and desired
speed. The data used to plot this graphs was obtained by observing the middle 60 vehicles
from a group of 900 vehicles moving on the highway. This was done to avoid the perturbations
which occur at the periphery of the simulation environment. For instance, a fast vehicle at
the front of the simulation would not have any slow vehicles in front of it, a fact which is an
artifact of the simulation setup and it would reduce the accuracy of the measurement. The
no-convoy graph was obtained under the assumption that all the vehicles in the traffic are
trying to maintain their desired speed by overtaking all slower vehicles. We assumed that
every overtaking incurs a small delay.
Convoy formation requires the vehicles to compromise over their desired speed. The ASL
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approach results in a large difference from the desired speed, because the vehicles will agree
on the slow speed of the front vehicle. The AVG approach is somewhat better, while the
SPF approach shows the smallest difference. This means that the SPF approach allows the
vehicles to drive the closest to their desired speed. This is because SPF based convoys tend
to agree on higher than average speed and the vehicles generally have the desire to move
at higher speed. Also the utility function guarantees that vehicles do not join convoys that
have large difference from their desired speed.
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Figure 3.11: The average difference of the desired speed of the vehicles from their measured
speed. The data was obtained by observing 60 vehicles in the middle of the highway. In the
absence of any convoy formation approach, the vehicles have the tendency to move at their
desired speed. The slight difference occurs because vehicle overtaking other vehicles need to
slow down and then readjust their speed. The ASL approach results in a large difference
from the desired speed, because the vehicles will agree on the slow speed of the front vehicle.
The AVG based approach is somewhat better, while the SPF approach shows the smallest
difference. This means that the SPF approach allows the vehicles to drive the closest to
their desired speed.
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3.4.2.5

Number of overtakings

Figure 3.12 shows the number of overtakings as a function of the density of the vehicles. In
general, the smaller the number of overtakings, the safer the traffic. The data used to plot
the graphs was also obtained by observing 60 vehicles in the middle of the highway.
As expected, in the absence of any convoy formation approach, there are large number
of overtakings. This number increases with the density (i.e. number of vehicles present on
60 km highway) of the vehicles. As expected, the number of overtakings are reduced by
using the convoy formation approaches. The number of overtakings are the smallest for the
SPF approach, followed by AVG and ASL. This can be attributed to the larger convoy sizes
resulting from the SPF approach. Also, the number of overtakings do not increase rapidly
with the SPF approach. This shows that the SPF approach scales better with the increased
density of the vehicles.
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Figure 3.12: The number of overtakings as a function of the density of the vehicles. In
general, the smaller the number of overtakings, the safer the traffic. The data was obtained
by observing 60 vehicles in the middle of the highway. As expected, in the absence of any
convoy formation approach, there are large number of overtakings. This number increases
with the density of the vehicles. As expected, the number of overtakings are reduced by
using the convoy formation approaches. The SPF approach results in minimum number of
overtakings. This can be attributed to the larger convoy sizes resulting using this approach
and the fact that vehicles within convoy do not overtake each other.
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3.4.3

Conclusions

It is a well-known fact that convoy driving has a beneficial effect on the fluency of the traffic,
improving safety, and (in average) reducing travelling time. Naturally, convoy driving can be
accomplished without the mediation of communicating agents, by adapting to the speed of
the previous vehicle (which is the equivalent of the ASL strategy). This is the approach taken
both by human drivers, as well as adaptive cruise systems. For more complex strategies,
however, it is necessary for vehicles to exchange information with each other. The AVG
and SPF influence strategies we proposed can not be accomplished without inter-vehicle
communication.
Our experimental results show that these more complex strategies bring significant benefits by allowing the formation of larger convoys, bringing the average speed of the convoys
closer to the desired speed of the participating agents and reducing the number of overtakings. The AVG influence strategy, relying only on speed information, readily available on
any vehicle performs better than the ASL strategy in all measurements. The SPF strategy,
although it requires additional information in the form of inter-vehicle distance, provides
additional benefits. Such inter-vehicle distance measurements are readily available in adaptive cruise systems in current high-end cars, and will probably become the standard in the
coming years.
In conclusion, while it requires additional hardware in form of the CDD or equivalent
device, the development of convoy driving algorithms for the uni-dimensional world of convoy
driving offers significant real world benefits.
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CHAPTER 4
EMBODIED AGENT APPLICATION: CONVOY DRIVING IN THE TWO
DIMENSIONAL WORLD

In this chapter, we present a negotiation based coalition formation mechanism for the two
dimension physical world. The agents are presumed to have limited communication range.
The utility function of an agent is defined as to minimize the time required to reach its
destination. Unlike the one dimensional case (where the agent are already co-located), the
agents need to agree on a rendezvous location before they can move together as a team.
In our negotiation based approach, the agents negotiate over a set of location and time
constraints to join and leave the convoy. The agreements are stored in the form of spatiotemporal commitments and are used both in the path planning as well as in the building
and evaluation of new offers.
Our working scenario will be coalition formation in a disaster area where agents need to
form convoys to traverse dangerous areas. We run our experiments on a dataset describing
New Orleans city after Hurricane Katrina.

4.1

Introduction

Efficient disaster response requires participants to form teams and coordinate their actions.
This process is complicated by a variety of factors:
Dynamic, unpredictable and dangerous environment. In the immediate aftermath
of a disaster (such as the hurricane Katrina in New Orleans or the asian tsunami) previously
safe areas might become dangerous or unaccessible. The environment might contain new
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sources of danger in the form of natural obstacles (damaged buildings) or even hostile agents
(such as looters or stray dogs).
Dynamic tasks. In rescue missions, tasks appear unpredictably. The discovery of a
wounded person at a dangerous location creates a new task with specific logistics, protection
and medical aspects. In severe disasters, the number of tasks can greatly exceed the available
resources. Occasionally, tasks need to be preempted for higher priority tasks.
Dynamic teams and collaboration patterns. Although some disaster management
teams are pre-established, trained together and have a clear pattern of command and control,
many teams are assembled on an ad hoc basis, as a response to emerging tasks. Teams are
composed from heterogeneous groups of entities: persons, vehicles, service animals, and so on.
Team members might not report to the same chain of command, might have communication
problems and their interests might not be completely aligned. For instance, the state police
and guerilla groups might cooperate in a rescue operation but resume hostilities after the
emergency.
Breakdown in communication lines. In many environments, we normally assume
that there is a full connectivity of the mobile agents. Police units normally maintain connection to a central dispatcher over dedicated frequencies. Although it is desirable to maintain
this organization in a disaster area as well, in practice, this centralized communication frequently breaks down. For instance, after hurricane Katrina, the policy could use their radios
only as peer-to-peer walkie talkies. This prevents the collection global information and
centralized command of operations.
In this chapter, we are concentrating on the negotiation regarding convoy formation for
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mobility in a dangerous environment.
Our assumption in this chapter is that forming convoys is always advantageous. This
assumption holds in many instances in disaster response applications; for instance many
organizations instruct their workers not to go alone to dangerous areas. There are, however,
several worthwhile exceptions. For instance, a damaged bridge of limited bearing capability
might only hold a small number of agents. In other situations it might be necessary to
reduce the size of the convoy for achieving stealth or to prevent alarming or offending the
local population. Thus, the utility of the convoy might not be super-additive (or even
monotonically increasing) with the number of participants. For instance, the stealth of a
convoy decreases with its size. These issues are subject of future research of our group.
The environment considered in this chapter assumes a 2-dimensional geographic area,
where we identify: safe areas which are traversable by any agent, danger areas which are
traversable only by convoys and unaccessible areas. The model can be extended in a straightforward way to involve more than three area types which affect the movement of the vehicles
in a variety of ways (such as slowing down, requiring higher energy consumption, and so
on). The goal of every agent is to reach a destination location. Beyond disaster rescue, these
types of scenarios arise in other applications as well, such as military operations in urban
terrain.
The time to reach the destination can be improved by the formation of convoys. In certain
cases, the agent can not reach the destination except through joining convoys. We assume
the agents self-interested but honest; the agents keep their negotiated commitments. The
embodied agents are using message based communication, which can be either point-to-point
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or broadcasted to all other agents in the transmission range.
Negotiation is the process by which a group of agents come to a mutually acceptable
agreement on some matter [JFL01]. In our scenario, the subject of negotiation is the joining
and leaving convoys, and the adaptation of the path of the convoy to the requirements of the
agent. The agents are exchanging a set of offers, based on their offer construction strategies.
The other party is using its offer evaluation strategy to make a decision, which can be either
to accept the offer, send a counteroffer or terminate the negotiation.

4.2
4.2.1

Convoy formation mechanism

Convoy structure and commitments

In this section we describe a mechanism for the structure of the convoys based on a set of
spatio-temporal commitments of the participant agents and the convoy itself and the way in
which this mechanism conditions the lifecycle of the convoys. In Section 4.3 we describe the
negotiation process which leads to the adoption of a certain set of commitments.
We define a convoy as a coalition of embodied agents which agreed on a common path
and schedule. Normally, the agents of the coalition have a common location and speed;
however, from a logical perspective, we consider an agent which has agreed to join a convoy
and it is on its way to a rendezvous point as part of the convoy.
Formally, a convoy C is described by a set of agents S = {A1 , . . . An }, a leader agent
AL ∈ S, and a set of commitments G = {g1 , . . . gn }. The commitments of the convoy can be
seen as representing the interests of the participating agents and are expressed as constraints
on the path of the convoy. The role of the leader is to negotiate on behalf of the convoy and
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to determine its path, taking into account its previous commitments G.
The commitment of the convoys are related to visiting locations and can be classified
as “before” (B) and “after” (A) commitments. A before commitment B(L, t) commits the
convoy C to arrive to location L not later than time t.

B(L, t) ∈ GC is satisfied iff ∃ tr ≤ t, location(C, tr ) = L

(4.1)

An “after commitment” A(L, t) commits the convoy C to leave location L not sooner
than time t (if the convoy reaches that location sooner, it can, of course wait at the location).

A(L, t) ∈ GC is satisfied iff ∃ tr ≥ t, location(C, tr ) = L

(4.2)

Intuitively, if two convoys X and Y want to rendezvous at the location LR , they will agree
on a rendezvous time tR and will take the commitments A(LR , tR ) ∈ GX and B(LR , tR ) ∈ GY
(or the other way around).
We will call a commitment g1 stronger than a commitment g2 and denote it g2 ⊆ g1 if
every set of actions which satisfies g1 also satisfies g2 .
Theorem 1
(a)

∀L, t1 ≤ t2 ⇒ B(L, t2 ) ⊆ B(L, t1 )

(b)

∀L, t1 ≤ t2 ⇒ A(L, t1 ) ⊆ A(L, t2 )

Proof:
(a) Let us consider a series of events such that B(L, t1 ) is satisfied. Then, according to
the definition, exists tr ≤ t1 such that location(C, tr ) = L. However, t1 ≤ t2 , thus tr ≤ t2 .
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Figure 4.1: Four stages of the convoy lifecycle: (a) before convoy formation, (b) after the
agreement to join in a convoy, (c) after rendezvous, (d) after leaving the convoy. The
previously traversed path is shown as a continuous line, while the current planned path is
shown as an interrupted line.
Thus, B(L, t2 ) is also satisfied, using the same time-point tr .
(b) Let us consider a series of events such that A(L, t2 ) is satisfied. Then, according to
the definition, exists tr ≥ t2 such that location(C, tr ) = L. However, t1 ≤ t2 , thus tr ≥ t1 .
Thus, A(L, t1 ) is also satisfied, using the same time-point tr .

4.2.2

An example of convoy formation

In the following we will discuss the evolution of the commitments throughout the lifecycle
of the convoy through an example. We will ignore both the negotiation flow as well as the
relative utility of the commitments for the agents; these aspects will be discussed in Section
4.3.
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4.2.2.1

Before convoy formation

Let us consider two agents X and Y moving from the source locations SrcX and SrcY to
their destinations DestX and DestY respectively. Planning their paths in isolation, they
reached the conclusion that their expected times to reach their destinations are ttx and tty
respectively. This can be represented through the commitments:

Gx = { B(DestX, ttx ) }

(4.3)

Gy = { B(DestY, tty ) }
This state of affairs is represented in Figure 4.1-a.

4.2.2.2

Convoy formation agreement

Through mechanisms to be discussed later, the two agents agree to join into a convoy at
location Ljoin and separate at the location Lleave which they will reach before the time tleave .
They agree that the leader of the convoy will be X.
The agents, through the recalculation of the paths, reach the conclusion that by forming
a convoy they can reach their destinations at t0tx and t0ty respectively. A simple model of
the rational, self-interested agents would require (t0tx < ttx ) ∧ (t0ty < tty ). This implies
B(DestX, ttx ) ⊂ B(DestX, t0tx ) and B(DestY, tty ) ⊂ B(DestY, t0ty ), thus the original, weaker
commitments can be removed from the set of commitments of the agents.
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This leads to the following set of commitments:

Gx = { B(DestX, ttx ),
A(Ljoin , tjoin ),
B(Lleave , tleave ) }

(4.4)

Gy = { B(DestY, tty )
B(Ljoin , tjoin ) }
The agents will modify their paths such that they will meet their commitments regarding
the join location (see Figure 4.1-b).

4.2.2.3

Rendezvous and convoy formation

If both agents successfully kept their commitments regarding the join location, they are able
to rendezvous and form a convoy at Ljoin . Once the time-point for a commitment passed, it
will be removed from the commitment set.
The convoy, having X as the convoy leader, has the following set of commitments:

Gc = { B(Lleave , tleave ) }

(4.5)

while the interior elements X and Y, have the commitments:

Gx = { B(DestX, t0tx ) }
Gy = {

B(DestY, t0ty )

This stage is shown in Figure 4.1-c.
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}

(4.6)

4.2.2.4

Leaving the convoy

At the location Lleave the agents forming the convoy separate. As the commitment B(Lleave , tleave )
was satisfied, it is removed. The two agents are following their own paths to their destinations, with their respective commitments being (see Figure 4.1-d):

Gx = { B(DestX, t0tx ) }
Gy = {

4.2.3

B(DestY, t0ty )

(4.7)

}

Multi-agent convoys

Our previous example concerned the simplest case, of a convoy formed of two agents, which
rendezvous at location Ljoin , and separate at Lleave . The model, however, generalizes in a
straightforward manner to the case of multiple agents joining and leaving the convoy. Thus,
we can define the operation of merging of two convoys C1 = {S1 , G1 } and C2 = {S2 , G2 }
such that S = {S1

S

S2 } where G1 ⊆ G

T

G2 ⊆ G, that is, the commitments of a merged

convoy are stronger than the individual commitments of the participants.
Similarly, a convoy C = {S, G} can split in two convoys C1 = {S1 , G1 } and C2 = {S2 , G2 }
with S = {S1

S

S2 }. Determining the commitments of the successor convoys is a complex

problem. Intuitively, the commitments of the larger convoy represent a compromise over the
commitments of the constituent agents. It is possible that some subsets Si of a larger convoy
can negotiate a new convoy such that the commitments Gi of the new convoy are stronger on
the subset of the locations which are of interest for their participants. Basically, this means
that the smaller convoy can have a path more favorable to its participants. In some cases,
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this might be beneficial to the remainder of the agents S2 = S − S1 , because they might be
able to negotiate a stronger commitment for themselves as well.
In other cases, however, the remainder of the agents might actually be worse off. For
instance, there might be only one agent remaining, who can not take advantage of the
benefits of moving in a convoy. We can use several mechanisms for to avoid this problem.
For instance, we can allow the split of the convoy only in cases when the operation is a Pareto
optimization (in the sense of improving on the performance of all participants). Alternatively,
we can impose penalties on the agents leaving the convoy before the agreed leave point.
Let us note here, that for multi-agent convoys, the number of possible combinations grows
very quickly, and the agents will not be able to do an exhaustive search of all the combinations. Due to limited computation capacity, and limited negotiation time, the agreement
eventually reached might be suboptimal (and in some cases, not even Pareto optimal). In
these situations, agents which have a greater computational power and/or better algorithms
can negotiate better deals than agents which lower computational power.

4.3

Convoy formation through peer-to-peer negotiation
4.3.1

Convoy formation alternatives

As we have shown in the previous section, the convoy formation mechanism revolves around
the commitments of the agents and convoys. Every agent A starts with a basic goal of reaching its destination DestA. Through a path planning process, assuming that it is traveling
alone, the agent will make a commitment of reaching the destination point before time tA ,
B(DestA, tA ). The act of joining a convoy creates new commitments, adding A(Ljoin , tjoin )
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and B(Lleave , tleave ) to the commitment of the convoy and B(Ljoin , tjoin ) to the commitments
of the joining agent.
There are multiple approaches through which the agents might end up taking these commitments. It is possible that a centralized command and control center explicitly tasks the
agents with certain commitments. In some cases, some level of negotiation might happen
between the control center and the agents; at the minimum, the agent needs to confirm
whether a certain commitment is feasible. In this chapter we consider the case when the
convoy formation happens through peer-to-peer negotiation between agents. This is frequently the case in emergency response situations where control centers either do not exist,
are out of communication range, or they are not recognized by all the participants. This
was the case for all the major recent natural catastrophes: the Katrina hurricane, the south
asian tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake.
To be able to correctly reason about the negotiation process, we will assume the participants to be self-interested. This is a correct model even if the individual goals of the
participants are, in the global picture, altruistic. For instance, there is a conflict of interest
between two rescue teams which are trying to perform rescue operations at locations A and
B, but need to form a convoy to traverse a dangerous area.
Thus, the model we are considering is that of multi-issue negotiation with the issues at
play being {Ljoin , tjoin , Lleave , tleave }. Note that two of the issues under negotiation are points
in the 2-dimensional space. The main difficulty of the negotiation based convoy formation is
that the issues under negotiation are in a complex relationship with each other. Many multiissue negotiation models assume that the issues under negotiation are the equivalent of the
74

price negotiation for a package of items, or the splitting of multiple pies (for a comprehensive
treatment of these kind of negotiations see [FWJ06]). This is not true in our case. The only
way in which the value of an offer can be ascertained is by recalculating the planned path
of the agent. Even then, some of the features of the offer are difficult to quantize. For
instance, a convoy might negotiate in such a way that it allows the agent to join but at
the same time, it tries to maximize the flexibility of the convoy in taking on future agents.
Our implementation of the negotiation uses heuristics in the offer formation process. The
heuristics allow us to encode the objectives of the participants and to reduce the number of
offers interchanged in the course of negotiation. However, every generated offer will be fully
evaluated by the convoy and the agent through a recalculation of the paths, to verify the
feasibility of the agreement and the exact benefit it offers for the agent.

4.3.2

Heuristic negotiation objectives

Let us consider the objective of the negotiation. We will denote with τC (L1 , L2 ) the time it
takes for convoy C to move from location L1 to location L2 . In the simplest case, at time
t an agent A with the destination DA and current location LA considers joining a convoy
C, which has a current set of commitments G. The agent has its current expected arrival
time tA = t + τA (LA , DA ). In the first approximation, the agent would join the convoy if
it can add to its list of commitments an agreement B(DA , t0A ) with t0A < tA , that is, it can
reach its final destination faster. However, even if this agreement is not feasible, it might be
worth for the agent to join the convoy up to an intermediate location called the leave point.
A sufficient condition for the agent to be worth joining the convoy until leave point Lleave is
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to have a commitment B(Lleave , tleave ) such that tleave + τA (Lleave , LA ) < tA . This is however
not a necessary condition; the agent might plan ahead for joining a different convoy after
leaving the current convoy at Lleave .
In the following we discuss the interests of the participants regarding the four issues
under negotiation Ljoin , tjoin , Lleave , and tleave . Our results are independent of whether the
participants are individual agents or convoys of multiple agents. However, the existing set
of commitments of the participants significantly affect their interests during the negotiation
process. The act of rendezvous involves an asymmetric set of commitments (independently
whether the participants are agents or convoys). Without loosing generality, we will assume
that one of the participants is the “joined”, and will make the A(Ljoin , tjoin ) commitment, and
the other one is the “joiner” which will make the B(Ljoin , tjoin ) commitment. If a standalone
agent A joins an already formed, multiagent convoy C than A will act as a joiner and C as
the joined. In case of a smaller convoy merging with a larger one, the smaller convoy will
act as the “joiner”.
Ljoin the join location. The interest of the both participants is to negotiate a join
location which is either as close to their current location as possible, or is in the general
direction of their respective destinations.
The preferences for the joined participant are: (a) to negotiate a join location L for which
it has an A(Ljoin , t) commitment, (b) a location for which it has a B(Ljoin , t) commitment,
(c) a location which is on the current projected path and (d) a location which is close to the
current projected path.
Intuitively, (a) does not involve any new commitment for the joined participant (if it
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manages to negotiate a join time earlier or the same as the previous commitment). While (b)
requires only a temporal commitment, without new restrictions on the path of the convoy.
A location of type (c) restricts the ability of the convoy to change its path (although its
current path remains valid), while a point of type (d) requires the convoy to change its path.
For the joining participant, similar considerations apply, however, the order of the preferences (a) and (b) are reversed due to the different commitments they need to take. If the
participant has a B(Ljoin , tx ) commitment, it can easily take any A(Ljoin , ty ) commitment
with ty > tx , as its path calculation is based on the assumption of time of arrival at the
location Lleave .
tjoin - the joining time. Once the agent and the convoy had identified a join location
they need to negotiate the join time. In broad lines, the joiner negotiates for the latest
possible join time (to increase its safety margin in getting there), while the joined for the
earliest time (because that minimizes its commitment in waiting for the agent). The join
time has to be at least the minimum time needed by the joiner to reach the join point (the
joined participants minimal arrival time is not strictly relevant, as its commitment is to
leave after the negotiated time). This is a simple linear negotiation, which (provided that all
other negotiation objectives are fixed) can be resolved with a monotonic concession protocol.
However, we need to observe that once the hard requirement of τ (Lcurrent , Ljoin ) < tjoin −tcurrent
is met, the rest of the negotiation is only about safety margins. Thus, an agent is more likely
to concede on this parameter, which does not affect its predicted performance.
Lleave - the leave location. For this location, the interest of the joiner is to negotiate a
location as close as possible to its final destination (except the case when it is planning to join
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another convoy on the leave location). The interest of the joined participant is to negotiate,
in the order of preference (a) a location for which an existing B commitment exists, (b) a
location for which an existing A commitment exists, (c) a point on the current planned path
and (d) a point close to the current planned path. The order of preferences for types (a) and
(b) is reversed for this point compared to the join point. An additional problem which needs
to be considered by the convoy is that at every leave location the resources of the convoy
are diminished and at the last leave location we end up with two independent agents, not
with a convoy and an agent. Thus, the interest of the convoy might be to negotiate for leave
points as far down as possible on its projected path. The ideal organization is a single leave
point where all the participant agents leave for their individual destinations.
tleave - the leave time. This parameter represents the guaranteed arrival time at the
leave location. tleave has a lower bound, limited by the physical time a convoy needs to
reach the location on the optimal path, while still meeting its other commitments. The
upper bound of this parameter is given by the limit at which it is not worth anymore for an
agent to join the convoy tupper
leave = tcurrent + τagent (Lcurrent , Ldestination ) − τagent (Lleave , Ldestination ).
Evidently, the interest of the joiner is an earliest possible time - preferably the lower bound.
The interest of the joined participant is to minimize its commitment, by committing to as
late time as possible. By accepting the lower bound, the convoy is essentially committing
that it will not change the path calculated at the conclusion of the current negotiation. This
limits its ability to accommodate agents joining in the future.
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4.3.3

Reducing the negotiation space

One of the difficulties in the practical negotiation process is that while the points of type
(a) and (b) are coming from a limited set of discrete choices, the points (c) are coming from
a one-dimensional while points (d) from a two dimensional continuum, limited only by the
resolution of the raster maps on which the systems operate. This leads to an unrealistically
large negotiation space, especially considering the fact that the evaluation of an offer requires
the recomputation of the path, and it is, therefore, computationally expensive.
To reduce the negotiation space to a more realistic size, we chose to identify a set of
discrete offer points on the convoy path. By restricting the choice of the join and leave
locations to the offer points, we guarantee that the negotiation happens over a discrete set of
choices. To discuss these points, we need to first clarify the difference between the projected
and preferred path of an agent. The projected path of the agent is the currently computed
path which the agent will take if it cannot form a convoy. According to our assumption,
this is always a path which traverses only safe zones. The preferred path of the agent is the
path which the agent would prefer to traverse if it would be in a convoy, it might involve
traversing danger zones and it is usually shorter than the projected path. We also introduce
the value of the offer point resolution δoffer which governs the maximum distance between
the offer points.
The set of offer points is composed of:
(i) Points related to which the agent or the convoy already has commitments.
(ii) Special points on the projected and/or preferred path of the agent or convoy. The
endpoints of the path, the intersections of the path with the danger zones and the intersec79

tions between the path of the agent and the negotiating partner are included first. Whenever
the distance on the path between two consecutive points O1 and O2 such that the path between them traverses only areas accessible to both negotiation partners is larger than δoffer ,
a number of equidistant new offer points are introduced on the curve between the O1 and
O2 , such that their distance would be smaller than δoffer .
(iii) Points outside the projected and/or preferred path. For the considered path P we
create a series of paths PiL and PiR where i = 1, 2, . . ., with the PiL being an equidistant path
at the distance i · δoffer at the left of the path P , while PiR at the right of the path P . We
use the techniques of point (ii) to generate the offer points on these paths.
The use of the offer points allows us to reduce the negotiation to a set of discrete points.
Furthermore, the set of the offer points can be further reduced through heuristics and feasibility checks. For instance, from the points of type (iii), we normally retain only the points
which are on the same side of the projected path as the current location of the negotiation
partner. Some of the points created through the methods might not be accessible in the
current state of the agent, and thus can be removed from the set.

4.3.4

Convoy joining subprotocol

To describe the negotiation flow we will use the concept of a subprotocol [BHJ00]. A subprotocol is a closed set of messages, exchanged by agents acting in certain roles, during a
conversation limited in time. The term closed specifies that any message in the subprotocol
will be answered with a message from the same subprotocol. The roles of the subprotocol
are indivisible: an agent either implements the complete role, or refuses to participate in the
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conversation.
The convoy joining subprotocol describes the negotiation process between an agent and
a convoy which are acting in the CandidateAgent and CandidateConvoy roles respectively.
The messages of the subprotocol are summarized in Table 4.1. An example message flow of a
conversation using this subprotocol is shown in Figure 4.2. Convoys and agents moving in the
field are broadcasting their presence through the Beacon message. Convoys are represented
by their lead agent; single agents wishing to form a convoy act as a single agent convoy.
Upon receiving the Beacon message, the candidate agent starts the negotiation by sending
a JoinOffer message, which contains the A() and B() commitments which the agent wishes
that the convoy will accept. The convoy replies with a CounterOffer message, which contains
its own terms. If an agent wants to accept the convoys’ counteroffer, it sends back the same
offer in a JoinOffer message, otherwise it sends a different offer. The convoy can accept the
agents offer by sending the Accept message. The agent replies with a Confirm message. At
this moment it is considered that the agents have agreed on joining the convoy and accepted
the corresponding commitments. At any moment during the negotiation, either participant
can end the negotiation by sending a Terminate message.
While the subprotocol specifies only the exterior view of the negotiation, the participating agents need to maintain their own views of the progress of the negotiation. This can
be done through one of the many approaches proposed in the literature: finite state machines, statecharts, Petri nets or others. In our implementation we have used a finite state
machine implementation to maintain the state of the negotiation. The finite state machine
representing the view of the CandidateAgent on the progress of the negotiation is presented
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Table 4.1: The convoy joining subprotocol
Id
ConvoyJoining
Roles
CandidateAgent (CA)
CandidateConvoy (CC)
Messages Beacon (CA → ANY)
JoinOffer (CA → CC)
CounterOffer (CA ← CC)
Accept (CA ← CC)
Confirm (CA → CC)
Terminate (ANY → ANY)

CandidateConvoy

CandidateAgent

The convoys signals its
existence by broadcasting a
beacon message.

Beacon
The vehicle sends an offer
to join the convoy

JoinOffer
The convoy can not accept
the offer, but sends a
counteroffer with weaker
commitments.

CounterOffer
JoinOffer

...
Accept
The convoy accepts the
offer. The vehicle
confirms the acceptance.
From now on the convoy
and the vehicle are
bound by the contract.

Confirm

Figure 4.2: A typical message sequence for the convoy joining subprotocol
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if false, send counter
offer

counter offer received
Evaluate

offer accepted

Wait for
Response

If offer location is not
available

Send
Acknowledgement

Terminate
conversat
ion

send terminate
conversation message

contract formed

get offer location using
current agent offer
strategy
Obtain
Send Join
Offer
Message
Location

start contract forming
conversation

if true, send acceptance
message

If offer location is
available then
send request message
to join at offer location

received join
confirmation, contract
formed

received terminate
conversation message

Conversation
Finished

Figure 4.3: A finite state machine representing the view of the CandidateAgent on the
progress of the convoy joining negotiation.
in Figure 4.3. A finite state machine is created for every negotiation process started. The
state machines are updated whenever messages are received and sent. The state machine is
discarded when a negotiation was terminated, or when an agreement is formed. Additional
interconnection between the state machines governs the interaction between the negotiations. This interconnection guarantees that only one accepted offer will be confirmed. Once
an accepted offer is confirmed by the agent, it will send terminate messages on all the other
negotiations.

83

4.4

Experimental results

We tested our coalition formation algorithms on a realistic scenario based on the environment
of New Orleans flooded by hurricane Katrina. The agents were implemented in the YAES
simulation environment [BT05]. The physical environment is a 2.0x3.2 km large area of New
Orleans, represented through a satellite photo with a resolution of 4 meters/pixel, obtained
from Google Maps (Figure 4.4). The safe, unsafe and unaccessible areas were obtained
partially from image processing, and partially manually edited. We assume that the agents
are moving at the very slow speed of 4.8 km/hr (which resembles the average pedestrian
walking speed [Nol96]). The latency in preparing and delivering the messages is assumed
to be 1.2 seconds, while the communication range of the agents is 200 meters - realistic for
walkie-talkie type device in an urban environment. Since the agents’ speed in this scenario
is relatively slow, it allows for a relatively large number of negotiation rounds, provided that
the negotiation is fully computer based and does not require user interaction.
The size of an offer message is very small (on the order of 20 bytes), as it contains
only the agent identifier and the binary encoded A(L, t) and B(L, t) values. Considering a
message turnaround time on the order of seconds, there is no communication bottleneck in
the negotiation, even when hundreds of agents are negotiating simultaneously. The main
challenge on the scalability of the approach is related to the combinatorial explosion of the
number of possible coalitions.
In this simulation, we assume that the offering agent does not have to wait for the other
agent at join location. The other agent might want to wait for certain time at offered join
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location to form the convoy.
In the following sections we present two case studies. The first scenario describes coalition formation between two agents, providing a detailed description of the course of the
negotiations and the exchanged messages. The second case study presents a scenario with
four agents, and contain more general situations such as cases when a negotiation breaks up
without forming an agreement and the formation of multi-agent convoys.

4.4.1

Scenario 1: Coalition formation with two agents

This scenario, shown on Figure 4.4 considers the movement of two agents from their starting
points Start-Agent-1 and Start-Agent-2 to their destination points Dest-Agent-1 and DestAgent-2 respectively.

1: Agent-1 path before negotiation
Start-Agent-2
6: Agent-1 reached destination

5: Leave location for Agent-2

4: Path after negotiation

Dest-Agent-1

7: Agent-2 is moving towards destination

3: Join location for
Agent-1 and Agent-2

Dest-Agent-2

Start-Agent-1
2: Agent-2 path before negotiation

Figure 4.4: An example run of the coalition formation algorithm, on a map representing an
area of New Orleans flooded in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The area marked in the
center of the map is a danger area, which can not be traversed by individual agents, but is
accessible for convoys.
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Table 4.2: The offers exchanged between Agent-1 and Agent-2
Offer No.

Sender

Receiver

1
2
3
4

Agent-2
Agent-1
Agent-2
Agent-1

Agent-1
Agent-2
Agent-1
Agent-2

Location of
the sender (m)
(568, 996)
(568, 1152)
(568, 1000)
(572, 1148)

Join constraint
< (m, m), min >
A((608, 1036), 0.7)
A((600, 1116), 0.7)
A((648, 1032), 1.3)
A((632, 1076), 1.3)

Leave constraint
< (m, m), min >
B((2372, 1984), 27.6)
B((2488, 576), 32.3)
B((2376, 604), 27.6)
B((2492, 576), 29.8)

As both agents start moving towards their destination, their initial path goes through the
path identified by note 1 and note 2 on Figure 4.4. The initial path for Agent-1 is roughly
4 km; while for Agent-2, it is 4.7 km. It will take Agent-1 about 50 minutes to reach its
destination, while Agent-2 will reach its destination in about 60 minutes. In this scenario,
we assume that Agent-2 starts moving towards it destination 5 minutes later than Agent-1.
After traveling some distance, Agent-1 and Agent-2 come within communication range
of each other and start negotiations for coordinating their movements. Table 4.2 shows the
offers and counter offers made during this negotiation process. The location of the agent is
shown as distance in meters from the top left corner of the map.
Offer 1: Agent-2 makes the first offer to Agent-1. It offers a join location constraint
for location (608,1036) in 0.7 minutes. The Agent-1 can reach the given location in no less
than 2 minutes. Since we assume that the offering agent (i.e Agent-2) is not going to wait,
Agent-1 can not possibly agree on this offer. So this offer gets rejected.
Offer 2: Agent-1 now makes a counter offer for join location (600, 1116) in 0.7 minutes.
This time, Agent-2 can reach the join location in 1.7 minutes, so this offer gets rejected too.
Offer 3: Agent-2 has now slightly moved from its previous location. It now make another
offer to Agent-1 for join location (648,1032) in 1.3 minutes. The Agent-1 can make to this
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location in 1.8 minutes. So it rejects the offer.
Offer 4: Agent-1 now makes a counter offer for join location (632,1076) in 1.3 minutes.
This time Agent-2 can reach the location in 1.2 minutes, so it agrees with the join location
constraint. Next, it evaluates the leave location constraint and finds that it will take it 47
minutes to reach its destination on its own. With the offered path, it will take 1.2 minutes to
reach join location, 29 minutes to reach leave location and 9 minutes to reach its destination
from leave location. So in total it will take it 39 minutes to reach its destination. Since it is
lower than the original time (i.e. 47 minutes), it will accept the offer.
The total time it takes for Agent-1 to reach its destination with this agreement includes
1.3 minutes to reach join location, 29 minutes to reach leave location and 1.1 minute to reach
destination from leave location. So in total it will take 31.4 minutes to reach its destination.
Given the very limited communication range, the agents are already in very close proximity during negotiation process. Therefore, we assume that no further negotiation (about
join time or leave time) is necessary and conclude the negotiation with the accepted offer
becoming the agreement between both agents. Agent-1 becomes the convoy leader (since its
offer was accepted) and Agent-2 joins the convoy at agreed join location.

4.4.2

Scenario 2: Coalition formation with four agents

In this scenario, four agents are moving towards their respective destinations. The Figure 4.5
shows the initial location of the agents and their respective paths before negotiations.
In this scenario, Agent-4 starts moving towards its destination about 17 minutes after
Agent-1. As agents start moving towards their destinations, Agent-1 and Agent-3 come
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1: Agent-1/Agent-3 path before
negotiation
Dest-Agent-1
Start-Agent-2

Dest-Agent-3

Dest-Agent-4

3: Agent-4 path before negotiation

Start-Agent-3

Dest-Agent-2
Start-Agent-1

Start-Agent-4

2: Agent-2 path before negotiation

Figure 4.5: An example run of the coalition formation algorithm with four agents.
within communication range and start negotiation. They do not reach an agreement because
the proposed offers from Agent-1 do not make Agent-3 to reach its destination earlier than
it can reach on its own. Similarly Agent-3 can not provide any better deal to the Agent-1.
As they move along, Agent-1 comes within communication range of Agent-2 and they start
negotiation. They soon reach an agreement and form a convoy. The Agent-2 becomes the
convoy leader (because its offer was accepted by Agent-1). The Figure 4.6(a) shows these
interactions.
As Agent-1 and Agent-2 move in convoy formation through unsafe region they encounter
Agent-4 moving towards its destination Dest-Agent-4. A negotiation takes place between
convoy leader Agent-2 and Agent-4 resulting in an agreement to join the convoy. The
Figure 4.6(b) shows these interactions. Agent-3 can also be seen in this snapshot moving
towards its destination.
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The convoy then splits at agreed location and Agent-1, Agent-2 and Agent-4 start moving
towards their respective destinations. The Figure 4.6(c) shows the splitting of the convoy.

Dest-Agent-1
Join location for Agent-1 and Agent-2
Dest-Agent-3
Dest-Agent-4

Start-Agent-2
Join location for Agent-4 with convoy
composed of Agent-1 and Agent-2

Leave location for Agent-1, Agent-2
and Agent-4

Start-Agent-3
Dest-Agent-2
Start-Agent-4
Start-Agent-1

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 4.6: Snapshots of the simulation: a) Agent-1 and Agent-3 can not reach agreement
while Agent-1 and Agent-2 reach agreement b) The convoy composed of Agent-1 and Agent2 reaches agreement with Agent-4 c) Agent-1, Agent-2 and Agent-4 split to reach their
respective destinations
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CHAPTER 5
COALITION FORMATION IN THE DOMAIN OF DYNAMIC
NONDETERMINISTIC SPATIO-TEMPORAL TASKS

In this chapter, we discuss the problem of coalition formation in the domain of dynamic,
nondeterministic, spatio-temporal tasks (DNSTT). This particular combination of problem
parameters has strong justification in practical applications, however, it received relatively
little attention in the agent community. Although related to the problems of coalition games
from game theory and task scheduling from distributed systems, we show that DNSTT problems have sufficient differences which warrant specific new approaches. We present a generic
approach towards solving problems in this domain relying on the encoding of the problem
domain in Markov Decision Process (MDP). The approach is described with a running example of the firefighter allocation problem in a disaster struck area. We evaluate the results
using the firefighter allocation problem in the Robocup Rescue simulation environment.

5.1

Introduction

We define the problem area of dynamic, nondeterministic, spatio-temporal tasks (DNSTT)
as follows. A group of agents {A1 , . . . Ak } are forming coalitions to handle a group of tasks
{T1 . . . Tn }. The tasks have a state which evolves in time even in the absence of the actions
of the agents (temporal aspect). The tasks are distributed in space, and the agents need to
be co-located with the tasks to perform actions on them (spatial aspect). The effects of the
actions of the agents and the evolution of the difficulty of the tasks is nondeterministic.
This problem is a more general form of several problems extensively studied in computer
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science as well as game theory, operations research and management sciences. To clarify
the nature of the differences from established problems, we will compare it with two well
established research areas: coalition games from game theory and task scheduling.
In game theory, coalition games [OR94a, Gor01, HW05, AHW06b, AHW06a] are games
in which agents are forming coalitions to increase their payoff. If we have a coalition of
agents {Ac1 , . . . Acj } the value of the coalition is v({Ac1 , . . . Acj }). An important problem in
coalition games is the payoff allocation, that is, the way in which the value of the coalition
is allocated to the participating agents. The theory of coalition games does not consider the
reorganization of the coalition, or the behavior of the agents in the coalition.
Task scheduling is another well studied problem in computer science and management.
Task scheduling assumes that there are a number of tasks to be executed using a limited
number of available resources. The tasks can have various resource requirements, and they
can have various forms of data or logical dependencies. One typical application of task
scheduling is job shop scheduling [Cof76] while other, more familiar for computer scientists
is the scheduling of large scientific computations [CK88, BSB01, BM02].
Despite the very different formulations, all three problems (DNSTT, coalition games and
task scheduling) are essentially resource allocation problems. All three of them have large
number of variants (the design space) and there is a certain overlap in their functionality.
Next, we explore some of the aspects of the resource allocation problems, highlighting the
strength and limitations of the three considered domains (DNSTT, coalition games and task
scheduling).
Number of tasks: how many tasks are considered by the problem. This can be static,
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if the number of tasks are known ahead of time, or dynamic if new tasks arrive during the
execution.
Task difficulty: the amount of time it takes for the task to be completed with a certain
amount of resources. This metric can only be applied to the same type of tasks. It does not
make sense to compare the difficulty of two different types of tasks which require different
resources. For example, sweeping the floor requires different resources than doing a tensor
product, and the resources needed to do a tensor product are rarer and more expensive.
However, we can compare the difficulty of two sweeping tasks. If one of the rooms is dustier,
it takes more time to clean with the same amount of resources. Thus we can say that the
time to clean with a certain number of resources can be a good metric for the difficulty of a
task.
The task difficulty can be on/off: the task can not be completed without a minimum
amount of resources; if the number of resources is above the sufficient, it will be completed
in a fixed amount of time. It can be heterogeneous: with some combination of resources, a
task can be executed faster. One example is executing batch programs on different hardware
configurations: the execution time depends on the speed of the hardware, the availability of
specialized processors and so on. Finally, we say that the task has a dynamic difficulty if
the execution of the task, for a given amount of resources, varies in function of time. This
variation might be either due to the external circumstances or due to the internal parameters
of a task. For instance, the time it takes to park a car in the UCF (University of Central
Florida) parking lot varies with the time of the day and the day of the week (external
circumstance). The difficulty to put out a fire or to rescue a wounded person becomes more
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difficult as time passes.
Task reward: the reward for executing the task. This is a parameter through which
the user expresses its relative preference over the tasks. It can be a fixed payoff expressed
in virtual currency. The field of coalition games puts a great emphasis on the sharing of
the reward among the participants in the coalition, as it is assumed that agents would not
participate in a coalition in which they are not treated fairly.
The task might have deadlines attached to it, with the understanding that, to obtain the
reward, the execution needs to be completed before the deadline.
Finally, the reward might dynamically evolve in time. In the DNSTT examples considered in the remainder of this chapter, the reward decreases with time. In other cases, the
reward can fluctuate in time. In general, the problem should not contain scenarios where the
reward is monotonically increasing, as this would make the agents postpone the execution
indefinitely.
Time: some scenarios consider the execution of the tasks as a temporal process. Coalition
games do not consider time. Both task scheduling and DNSTT consider task execution as a
temporal process.
Space: the application domain of DNSTT considers the tasks to be distributed in space,
with the spatial distribution affecting the reward, the difficulty and the cost of resource
allocation. Coalition games do not consider space. Task scheduling usually does not consider
space, but in some cases it considers the closely related notion of the location of the task
and resources on the internet. Thus, the cost of moving physical resources is replaced by the
cost of transferring files over connections with limited bandwidth.
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Table 5.1: Comparative table of three problem domains: coalition games, task scheduling and dynamic, nondeterministic,
spatio-temporal tasks.
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Attribute
Number of tasks

Coalition games
Static

Task difficulty
Task reward
Time considered
Space considered
Objectives

Not considered
Static
No
No
Maximize reward
Maximize fairness of reward
distribution
Not considered

Nondeterminism

Resource to task mapping

Many resources to one task

Task scheduling
Static
Sometimes: dynamic
Static, usually heterogeneous
Static
Yes
Usually no
Minimize total execution time
Maximize robustness

DNSTT
Dynamic

Sometimes considered: execution
might fail, execution times are
nondeterministic
Varies (see description in text)

Stochastic evolution of the difficulty.
Stochastic effects of the actions
Many resources to one task
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Dynamic
Decreases in time
Yes
Yes
Maximize reward
Minimize cost

Relationship of resources and tasks: The possible relationships between resources
and tasks can be: one resource to a task, many resources to one task or one resource shared
by multiple tasks. The allocation might be static (does not change in time) or dynamic (a
resource allocated to a task might be moved, normally after the completion of the task).
Coalition games have many resources statically allocated to a task. In task scheduling,
we can have two different views on resources. In the coarse grained view, the resource is
the host. In this case, we usually allocate one resource (host) to a task. In the second,
fine grained view, the resources are more specific quantities such as memory, disk space,
processing power or bandwidth. In this case, multiple resources are allocated to a task.
Finally, the DNSTT domain allocates multiple resources to one task, dynamically.
Nondeterminism: This criteria concerns whether the attributes of the domain are
subject to stochastic factors. Nondeterminism is not considered in coalition games. Early
work in task scheduling considered task execution to be deterministic. The subfield of “robust
scheduling” [BM02, ASM04, SSM05] is considering the probability that the task execution
can fail. Recent efforts consider scenarios when resources fail during execution.
The output: The output of the coalition game is a coalition configuration (which is
basically a static resource allocation) and a reward distribution scheme, which specifies the
way in which the reward is distributed among the participants.
For the task scheduling domain, the output is a schedule which describes the allocation
of the resources to the tasks in a time dependent manner. Some scheduling algorithms also
create backup schedules. For instance, if some resources fail, the system can switch to a
backup schedule. Collections of primary and backup schedules can be seen as a policy.
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The output of a solution to the DNSTT domain is a policy that describes the coalitions
which need to be formed in a certain state of the tasks. The policy can be seen as a list of
state-action pairs, where the state is the current state of the world, while the action is the
current coalitions formed and the coalition actions taken.
Objective: For the coalition games, the objectives are to maximize the reward and to
optimize fairness of the reward distribution. For task scheduling the goal is to minimize
the total execution time. In some variants of the task scheduling problem, other objectives
are pursued as well: maximize the robustness of the schedule, maximize the fraction of the
tasks successfully executed and so on. For the DNSTT domain, the goal is to maximize the
reward.
In conclusion, we find that the DNSTT problem domain is in the same family as coalition
games and task scheduling, however, it has specific characteristics in the spatial distribution of tasks and the dynamic evolution and non-determinism of the task difficulty. While
techniques developed for coalition games and task scheduling may serve as an inspiration or
starting point for DNSTT algorithms, they do not provide all the necessary functionality.
In the remainder of this section, we present a brief introduction of Markov decision
process (MDP) in Section 5.1.1 and provide examples of some real world applications that
can be modeled using DNSTT in Section 5.1.2.

5.1.1

Markov Decision Process Model

A Markov Decision Process (MDP) is used to model decision making process in a stochastic
domain, where the action outcome is non-deterministic. MDPs are an extension of Markov
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chains; the difference is the addition of actions (allowing choice) and cost/rewards (giving
motivation).
An MDP is defined as a tuple (S, A, P, C)) where:
• S, is a state space
• A, is a action space
• P (si , sj , a), is the transition probability of moving from state si to state sj given that
action a is performed in state si .
• C(si ) is the cost of a state si .
The operation of an MDP can be briefly described as follows. The agent can be in any of
set of states si , i = 1, . . . , n. The actions the agent can take are aj , j = 1, . . . , m, although
some of the actions might not be available in all states. If an agent in state si takes an action
a it will transition to state sj with probability P (si , sj , a). An important component of an
MDP is the reward or cost. In the DNSTT domain, we are concerned with cost minimization,
so we use a cost model. The cost model can be associated with a given state as C(si ), with
an action in a given state as C(si , a) or with a certain transition taken as a result of an
action as C(si , a, sj ).
For agents with an infinite time horizon, the goal of the agent is to minimize the sum
of the costs collected over its time horizon. For agents with an infinite time horizon we
define a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1], and we let the agent minimize

P∞
t=0

C(si ). The discount

factor shows that the agent prefers a low cost at time t + 1, γ times less compared with the
preference for the same cost at moment t. γ is usually chosen as a value close to 1.
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Solving an MDP is equivalent to finding a policy T : S → A, that is, a rule which tells
the agent that in state si it should take action a = T (si ). Following the policy will minimize
the agents’ discounted cost. There are several ways of solving MDPs, the most popular ones
being value iteration which seeks to establish the value of each state and policy iteration
which seeks to find the policy directly, without establishing the state values as well. Various
combinations of these approaches are also frequently used.
The Markovian nature of the problem is reflected by the fact that the action of the agent
depends only on the current state - it does not depend on the history. What this means
in practice is that the MDP state needs to encode not only the state of the agent but the
state of the environment as well, together with whatever historical information is deemed
necessary. Finding an efficient representation of all the necessary information in the form of
a finite (and preferably small) set of states is critical to the success of the MDP approach.
The advantage is that once we have determined this representation and have acquired the
associated probabilities, the MDP approach will calculate the optimal decision policy (in
the limit of the expressivity of the state representation and the accuracy of the transition
probabilities).

5.1.2

Application examples

Our work in the DNSTT domain was justified by the needs of applications in the disaster
rescue domain.
We had seen that in most respects, the DNSTT domain is more general than the typical
applications of coalition games and task scheduling. Generality, however, normally comes
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with the cost of higher computational complexity, and modeling difficulties. More specialized theories can exploit the characteristics of their domain for better results. The simpler
definition of coalition games allows reasoning about the distribution of rewards. Although
the static scheduling problem is NP-complete, modern algorithms for the static scheduling
of tasks can provide near optimal schedules in low polynomial time.
There are, however, an important number of practical applications which are a natural
application of the DNSTT model, but which can not be modeled as coalition games or task
scheduling without ignoring important parts of the problem.
Fire fighting in disaster situations. Several fires are erupting in a city. There is
an insufficient number of firefighters to cover all the current fires with sufficient resources
simultaneously. The fires increase in intensity in time (temporal aspect). The fires are
spatially distributed, reallocating a resource from one fire to the other comes with a cost
(spatial aspect). The reward for putting out a fire, interpreted as a portion of the building
which was saved is decreasing in time. There is an uncertainty in the result of the firefighting
action: the same amount of water might or might not put out a fire, due to some unknown
parameters of the building (nondeterminism).
Medical rescue in disaster situations. A team of (potentially specialized) medics
need to respond to a number of emergencies in a city. There is an insufficient number of
medics to cover all the emergencies with sufficient resources simultaneously. Without medical
intervention, the state of the patients deteriorates (temporal aspect). The patients are
distributed in space (spatial aspect). The reward, measured as the inverse of the permanent
health damage of the patient decreases in time. There is an uncertainty in the result of the
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medical intervention, as the therapy might or might not be successful.
Real time stock market trading. A number of computing resources are used to
calculate arbitrage opportunities. The reward of a task execution decreases in time, as
somebody else might take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity sooner (temporal aspect).
The difficulty of estimating the value of an opportunity changes in time, due to the evolution
of the market. The result of an action might be probabilistic, as the trading partners may
decline offers. This application has no spatial component.
The DNSTT domain having a very general definition, a large number of potential applications exist. It is not necessary for an application to exhibit all the differentiating features
of the DNSTT domain. However, if an application can be sufficiently constrained to fit
the coalition game, task scheduling or other, more restricted models, it is recommended to
use algorithms from those families, avoiding the modeling and computational complexity of
the DNSTT domain. In the rest of this chapter, we develop a method for solving DNSTT
problems which relies on the encoding of the problem domain in Markov Decision Processes
(MDP).

5.2

A generic approach for DNSTT problem solving

In the following we describe a general approach for solving DNSTT problems. We will
consider a fully specified DNSTT problem, exhibiting all the differentiating attributes:
• Dynamic evolution of task difficulties
• Nondeterminism in the effects of actions
100

Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7

Develop a stochastic model for the evolution of the task in time.
Develop a model for joint action of the agents.
Develop a stochastic model of the evolution of tasks in response to the
actions.
Develop a cost and reward model
Using the models developed above, specify one or more Markov decision
processes modeling the problem domain.
Solve the MDP(s) using the appropriate algorithms (value iteration, policy
iteration, hybrid methods)
Interpret the MDP(s). Assemble the policy for the agents from the solutions of the MDP(s).

Figure 5.1: The steps of the general approach to the solution of the DNSTT problem.
• Spatial distribution of tasks
• The consideration of time in the task execution
Naturally, if our target domain does not exhibit one of the attributes, it allows us to
simplify the model. The general approach we propose for the solution of the DNSTT problem
is composed of 8 steps and it is described in Figure 5.2. The most complex parts of the
approach are concerned with the building of the domain models and the interpretation of
the solutions. The solution of the MDP, although it is of a high computational complexity,
is relying on well known, standard algorithms.
As with most problems involving real world settings with MDPs, there is always a danger
of the combinatorial explosion of the number of states and actions. The developer needs to
use domain specific knowledge to exploit simplification opportunities to maintain the MDP
at a manageable size.
In the following we describe the steps of our approach in greater detail. We will use the
disaster rescue fire fighter allocation problem as our running example. For the presentation of
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every step, we first discuss the general approach, and then we illustrate it using the firefighter
domain. The same firefighter application will be used in the experimental evaluation of the
approach.

5.2.1

Step 1: Develop a model for the evolution of the individual task in
time

We assume that the state of the task T at time t can be characterized by a measure M (T, t).
We are looking for an expression which describe the state of the task at time t + 1, in
the absence of any actions from the agents. In the DNSTT domain the evolution of the
state is assumed to be nondeterministic. The value of a (continuous) measure at time t + 1
would then be described as a probability distribution over possible values of M . As such
distributions are very difficult to acquire, we choose to discretize the value of M . We assume
that the value of can be one of the discrete values M (T, t) ∈ {m1 , m2 . . . mq }.
The choice of the number of discrete values is technically limited by the accuracy of the
measure. In practice, however, we might choose to represent a lower number of discrete
states to reduce the complexity of the resulting MDP.
Once the M (T, t) is expressed as a discrete value, M (T, t + 1) can be expressed with a
series of probabilities. If we assume M (T, t) = mx , we have:


∅


m1 with probability pT (mx → m1 ) = pTx1




M (T, t + 1) =
...





∅

 mq with probability pT (mx →
mq ) = pTxq
with

Pq
i=1

(5.1)

pTxi = 1. These probabilities form a matrix of q 2 values, which can be acquired
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Table 5.2: The discrete states of a task representing a building on fire.
Fire Level
Description
NO-FIRE
The building is not on fire.
LOW-FIRE
The building has just
caught fire.
LOW-BURNT
The building extinguished
soon after catching fire.
MEDIUM-FIRE
The building has been on
fire for some time.
MEDIUM-BURNT
The building extinguished
after being on medium fire.
HIGH-FIRE
The building has been on
fire for a long time.
HIGH-BURNT
The building extinguished
after being on high fire.
COMPLETELY-BURNT The building has been completely burnt.
either through theoretical analysis of the problem domain or from historical data. The
probabilities pTij are normally task dependent. However, in most scenarios, the tasks are not
unique, but can be seen as coming of a finite number of classes. Thus we need to acquire
only a finite number of probability matrices.
In our example scenario, the measure of the task is the state of the fire in the building.
Although there are a large number of possibilities, we have reduced the number of states to
eight discrete states shown in Table 5.2.
As every building is different and setting buildings on fire is not an acceptable method of
obtaining transition probability data, we need to cluster the buildings in types and predict
the evolution of a building on fire through historical data from buildings of the same type.
We consider three types of buildings distinguished by their size: SMALL (defined as smaller
than 1000 sqft), MEDIUM (between 1001 and 2000 sqft) and LARGE (larger than 3000
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Figure 5.2: The transition probabilities for a single small building. The terminal states are
gray. Some of the states are not reachable.
sqft).
For instance, the probabilities in the case of a small building create the Markov chain
in Figure 5.2. We assume LOW-FIRE to be the initial state. Some of the states are not
reachable in this graph, reflecting the fact that buildings on fire do not extinguish themselves.
If left unattended, the fire will eventually cover and burn the building completely.
.

5.2.2

Step 2: Develop a model for the joint actions of the agents

At this step we need to determine the actions which can be executed by the individual agents,
and the ways in which the actions are assembled into joint actions for the case when the
agents are acting in a coalition.
In general, if agents A1 . . . Ak are acting in a coalition towards achieving a task T , each
agent Ai chooses an individual action ai . The composition of the individual actions forms
a coalition action ca = {a1 . . . ak }. The effect of the tuple can be a complex function of the
individual actions.
If each agent can choose from m possible actions, this means that mk distinct coalition
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actions are theoretically possible. This number, however, can be usually drastically reduced
with careful domain specific analysis. Most application domains have a limited set of feasible
coalition actions. A coalition action, on its turn, determines the actions of the participating
agents.
In our example scenario, the action model is very simple. The only action the agents can
take is to use water to extinguish the fire. The agents are assumed to be homogeneous, and
the resulting action is the sum of the actions. If each firefighter can apply 5 units of water in
a unit of time, 10 firefighters will apply 50 units of water. Thus, the actions can be simply
represented with the number of firefighters participating in the coalition.
However, the linear composition of the actions does not necessarily means a linear composition of the effects of the actions. It is not, in general, true that 50 units of water will
extinguish the fire 10 times faster than 5 units.

5.2.3

Step 3: Develop a stochastic model of the evolution of the tasks in
response to actions

In Step 1 we have considered the evolution of tasks without any actions from agents, in Step 2
we considered the model of the composition of the actions of the agents into coalition actions.
In this step we consider the evolution of the tasks with the coalition actions being applied.
We assume that task T is at time t in state mx . A coalition of agents CA = {A1 , . . . Ak } are
acting on the tasks performing a coalition action ca = {a1 . . . ak }. We are interested in the
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state of the task at time t + 1.


ca


m1 with probability pT (mx → m1 )




M (T, t + 1, ca) =

...





ca

 mq with probability pT (mx →
mq )

(5.2)

Note that now the probabilities depend both on the current state, the task and the
coalition action. If we assume that there is a discrete number n of possible coalition actions,
we will have n independent probability matrices of size q 2 . These probabilities can be
acquired from historical information or domain specific analysis.
While the state of the possible states of the task is the same as in Step 1, the effects
of the actions frequently make states which were not reachable in the absence of an action,
reachable.
In our example, we can model the coalition action simply with the number of agents
participating in firefighting. Figure 5.3 illustrates the evolution of the state of a small
building as the result of the coalition action of 2 (continuous lines) or 3 (dotted lines)
firefighters. We did not include actions with 1, 4 or more firefighters for the purpose of
clarity. Comparing with Figure 5.2, we can make several observations. States such as LOWBURNT, MEDIUM-BURNT and HIGH-BURNT, which were not reachable in the absence
of actions, are now reachable. On the other hand the COMPLETE-BURNT state becomes
unreachable, reflecting the fact, that if there are at least two firefighters working on a small
house, the house will never be completely burnt. Another observation is that the states form
two disjoint graphs - there is no transition from the LOW-FIRE state to the MEDIUM106

Figure 5.3: The transition probabilities for a single small building as the effects of the
coalition actions of 2 (continuous lines) or 3 (dotted lines) firefighters. The terminal states
are gray.
FIRE state for neither for the action of the 2 or 3 firefighters. Still the building can reach
the MEDIUM-FIRE state, for instance if no firefighter is working on it. As the DNSTT
problem assumes a dynamic formation of the coalitions, this is possible.
The full collection of transmission probabilities for the case of a small building and
coalitions of at most 4 agents is shown in Table 5.3.
.

5.2.4

Step 4: Develop a cost and reward model

Until now we did not consider neither which of the states of the tasks are more favorable,
neither the cost associated with the actions. Let us discuss the problem of rewards by
contrasting it with classical task scheduling. In task scheduling, a task can be in one of the
four states: READY, RUNNING, DONE and FAILED, with the latter two being terminal
states. Naturally, we prefer the DONE state to the FAILED state. We say that the DONE
state carries a reward r > 0, while the FAILED state carries either no reward, or it carries
a penalty p < 0.
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Table 5.3: Transition probabilities for small building with four firefighters. The fire levels are indicated with integer values and are associated as LOW-FIRE=1, MEDIUMFIRE=2, HIGH-FIRE=3, LOW-BURNT=4, MEDIUM-BURNT=5, HIGH-BURNT=6 and
COMPLETE-BURNT=7 respectively
Fire
level
1

2

3

Fire
fighters
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4
0
1
2
3
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0.81
0.81
0.23
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.19
0.19
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.88
0.88
0.88
0.80
0.71
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.12
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.97
0.93
0.87
0.85
0.82

0.00
0.00
0.77
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.20
0.29
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.13
0.15
0.18

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

In the DNSTT model, there are a larger number of terminal states. We need to associate
a certain reward with each of the states. The reward expresses the relative preference over
the states and also the relative preference over the various states of the individual tasks.
In addition to the rewards associated with the states, we can also have costs associated
with the actions. These costs allow us to express preferences over various actions with
equivalent or similar effects.
For our example we define a reward for the terminal states in the following way.
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Bi =






Ai × 3/4, if Fi = LOW-BURNT









Ai × 1/2, if Fi = MEDIUM-BURNT




Ai × 1/4, if Fi = HIGH-BURNT









0,
if Fi = COMPLETE-BURNT

(5.3)

where, Ai represents the total area of the building i, Bi represents the unburnt area of
the building i and Fi is the fire level of building i.
Thus, we define the reward of the firefighting as the area of the buildings saved. As the
firefighters have a single possible action (i.e. firefighting), we define a cost for a collaborative
action to be proportional with the number of firefighters participating in the coalition. Thus,
in general we will prefer smaller coalitions, as long as the achieved terminal state is identical.

5.2.5

Step 5: Specify a Markov decision process

In the next step of the process, using the models developed in steps 1-5 we create a Markov
decision process whose solution allows us to extract the optimum desired coalition structure.
To build the MDP we need to specify the (a) states, (b) the actions (c) the transition
probabilities and (d) the rewards. The components rely on the models developed previously,
still, as we will see, assembling the MDP requires non-trivial technical decisions.
(a) Determining the global states of the MDP
A global state defines the MDP state in terms of the set of tasks in the system. The global
state of the system with k tasks is a k-tuple of the discrete states of the individual task:
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gm = (m(1) , . . . m(k) ) where m(i) ∈ {m1 . . . mq }. There are k q number of possible states.
(b) Determining the global actions
The actions of the system are defined by the coalitions formed and the actions taken by
that coalition. For the sake of a uniform representation we assume that there is one coalition
per task, which can be an empty coalition. As we had seen the coalition action is determined
by the actions of the individual agents in the coalition. The global action ga is thus defined
as:
ga = {ca1 . . . cak } where cai = {ai1 . . . aini }

(5.4)

where ni is the number of agents in coalition i. The action of an empty coalition is the
empty action.
The number of possible coalitions is, naturally, very large. If we have k tasks and m
agents, the number of coalitions can be calculated by considering that each agent chooses
independently which task will work on. In this case the number of possible coalitions is k m .
If we assume that the agent might also choose not to be part of any coalition, the number
of alternatives becomes (k + 1)m .
Naturally, we need to find ways to reduce the number of potential coalitions and actions.
This can be done by exploiting application specific features. For our example, we have two
specific properties of the domain which allow us to drastically reduce the number of the
actions: (i) we assume that all the firefighter agents are equivalent and interchangeable and
(ii) the only action of the agent is firefighting. We can thus represent a global action ga only
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with the number of agents participating in each coalition:

ga = {n1 . . . nk } where

k
X

ni = m

(5.5)

i=1

The possible coalitions under these assumptions can be generated by the possible integer
partitions of m into k places. One such recursive algorithm for partitioning m agents to k
tasks is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 A recursive algorithm for integer partitioning
IntegerPartition(m, k)
C ← An empty list of the list of integers
if (k = 1)
L ← An empty list of integers
Add m to the list L
Add the list L to the list C
output C
for i ← 0 to m
for each list P ∈ IntegerPartition(m − i,k − 1)
Append i to the front of the list P
Add the list P to the list C
output C

(c) Assigning probabilities.
If we make the assumption that the tasks are independent of each other, then the probability of the transition from a global state to another as a response to a global action is
the product of the transition probabilities on a per task basis, with respect to the coalition
action applied to the given task.
(1)

(k)

If the system is in a global state gmx = (mx , . . . mx ), and the global action performed is
(1)

(k)

ga = {ca1 . . . cak }, the probability to transition to a new global state gmy = (my , . . . my )
will be:
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k
´ Y
³
³
´
ga
cai
(i)
p gmx → gmy =
p(i) m(i)
→
m
x
y

(5.6)

i=1

If the tasks are not independent, their interdependencies need to be taken into account.
For instance, in the case of our running example, it is possible that two buildings on fire are
located next to each other, and thus the evolution of the fires is co-dependent. This adds
additional modeling difficulty, but it does not change the complexity of the resulting MDP.
Let us illustrate the building of the final MDP through a simple example. To maintain
the graphs readable, we will simplify the firefighting model to a model where each building
can be in only k = 3 possible states: Fire (F), Burned (B) and Extinguished (E). We assume
that if there is at least one firefighter working on the building, it will be extinguished, while
if no firefighter is working on the building, it will burn down. Figure 5.4 illustrates the
building of the final MDP for two buildings and one single firefighter. The resulting MDP,
as expected, has k 2 = 9 states. The possible team actions, in each state are two: (1, 0)
representing that the firefighter is allocated to the first building, and (0, 1) representing that
the firefighter is allocated to the second building.
The final problems regarding the building of the MDP are the assignment of the costs
and rewards. The definition of the MDP can be formulated in three different ways: either
by assigning rewards to being in a given state R(si ), with an action in a given state R(si , a)
or with a certain transition taken as a result of an action R(si , a, sj ). While the formulations
are ultimately equivalent, in the sense that they define the same design space, the MDP
solvers usually support only one of them. Depending of the original problem formulation, we
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Figure 5.4: Creating an MDP for a simplified version of the firefighter problem with only
three states: Fire (F), Burned (B), and Extinguished (E). The final MDP is assembled for
the case of one firefighter and two buildings.
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might need to transform the MDP to accommodate the different formulation. Most MDP
solvers expect the rewards to be associated with state-action pairs.
In the case of our model, we are concerned with the cost of the actions and the reward
to reaching one of the preferred terminal states. The cost of the action can be represented
easily, by replicating it for all the current states where the actions can be taken. However,
there is a problem with the rewards for the terminal states: as the reward it defined on the
starting state and the action taken, we can not assign the reward, as there is no guarantee
that the next state will be the terminal state. To work around this problem, we modify the
MDP in such a way that the reward can be attached to a transition which happens with
a probability of 1. We introduce a new terminal state called FINAL and a special action
called Finalizing. The previous terminal states of the MDP will become non-terminal (we
will mark them in our code as semi-terminal). The Finalizing action taken in these states
will lead to a probability p = 1 to the FINAL state. Now, we can attach the reward to the
combination of the semi-terminal state and the Finalizing action.
For the case of firefighting with a single building the transformation is shown in Figure
5.5.

5.2.6

Considering the influence of spatial distribution of tasks and agents

In the DNSTT domain the tasks are distributed to various physical locations. Usually, the
assumption is that the agents need to be co-located with the tasks to be able to perform
actions. The spatial aspect of the problem appears in three different ways in the behavior
of the agents:
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Figure 5.5: Transformation of the MDP to allow for the expression of a reward for reaching
a terminal state. A new, single terminal state FINAL is introduced. The previous terminal
states are becoming non-terminal, and a special action Finalizing moves from them to the
FINAL state with the probability p = 1. The rewards will be attached to the Finalizing
transition.
• the actions might have different effects based on the location
• the costs of the actions depend on the spatial location of the task
• there is a cost associated with the agent moving from one task to another (which will
appear as a cost associated with re-organizing coalitions)
Actions which have different effects depending on the location. This does not
affect the general form of the DNSTT problem, because we assumed that the effects of the
actions are task-dependent. The physical location is just one of the possible identifying
attributes of the task. However, this assumption prevents our optimization based on the
clustering of the tasks. Tasks which have before fall into the same category and were treated
interchangeably, are now separated by their physical location. This problem requires domain
specific analysis to determine whether the clustering is still valid. One possible approach
is to divide the classes of tasks into subclasses which account for the physical location.
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For instance, we can divide the class SMALL-BUILDING to SMALL-BUILDING-NEARWATER and SMALL-BUILDING-FAR-FROM-WATER.
Cost of action dependent on the location. We assume that from the problem
specification we know that if task T is located in physical location (xT , yT ) then the cost
of performing action a on task T will be c = c(a, (xT , yT )). For instance, the cost might
be dependent on the distance from the home location of the agent. In many cases, this
distance will not be the euclidian distance, but the length of the shortest path found by a
path-planning algorithm considering the environment and the constraints of the agent.
We assume that these costs can be calculated before the assembly of the final MDP. The
calculated cost can be attached in the MDP to the task/coalition action pair. For instance,
in our application, we can make the assumption that the cost of firefighting is proportional
with the distance of the building from the nearest water source. We can then use a path
planning algorithm, such as A* to find the best path of the firefighters from the building to
the water source and back and use the length of the round trip to calculate the cost.
The cost of reorganizing coalitions
In our approach for solving DNSTT problems, the formation of coalition is encoded in
the actions. Let us consider the tasks T1 and T2 at geographic locations (x1 , y1 ) and (x2 , y2 ).
Assume that at time t = 1 we have a coalition configuration {{A1 , A2 }, {A3 }}, that is, agents
A1 and A2 are working on task T1 , while A3 is working on task T2 . If at time t = 2 we change
the coalitions to {{A1 }, {A2 , A3 }} this requires for the agent to move from location (x1 , y1 )
to location (x2 , y2 ), incurring a cost.
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Intuitively, a high quality policy needs to optimize the coalition reorganization in such a
way as to minimize the relocation cost of the agents. The problem is that the requirements
of such a policy are difficult to describe in an MDP. Let us consider the fragment of MDP
in Figure 5.6. The action taken in state C is {{A1 }, {A2 , A3 }}. As we had seen before, the
cost of this action depends on whether the coalition has changed; in our case, if the previous
state was A, the coalition has changed, if the previous state was B, it did not. Naturally,
when a policy is executed in real life, it is easy to determine which was the previous state.
However, while solving the MDP, we don’t have this information, because of the Markovian
property of the states specify that they are historyless. At state C we don’t know whether
we arrived from state A or B. If historical information is needed in the MDP it needs to
be encoded directly in the states. In our case, for instance, one solution would be to split
the state C into states C 0 and C 00 in the way shown in Figure 5.7. Thus, the states C 0 and
C 00 encode the recent history of the nodes. This way, the reorganization cost can be directly
encoded in the MDP. Unfortunately, this approach increases the number of states in the
MDP, increasing its computational complexity.

5.2.7

Analysis of MDP allocations based on spatial constraints

The policy generated by an MDP that accounts for spatial constraints (e.g. the cost of action
dependent on the location of the task) can vary in various ways from a policy which treats
all the tasks spatially equal (e.g. that the tasks are at equidistance from the central station).
In this section, we intend to compare two such policies to develop an understanding of how
the spatial constraints affect the policies generated by the MDP. We shall refer to the MDP
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Figure 5.6: The fragment of MDP illustrating the problem of assigning the reorganization
cost of the coalitions to specific actions.

Figure 5.7: The fragment of MDP from Figure 5.6, modified as to allow the encoding of the
cost of coalition reorganization. The state C was split into states C 0 and C 00 which encode
whether a coalition reorganization was necessary or not.
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Table 5.4: Comparison of MDP policies with limited number of available firefighters
State (L1 , L2 )
Pe
Ps
(MD-MED,MD-MED)
(0, 6) (6, 0)
(SM-LOW,SM-LOW-BURNT) (3, 3) (6, 0)
(SM-LOW-BURNT,SM-LOW) (0, 6) (3, 3)
(SM-LOW,MD-LOW)
(2, 4) (2, 4)
policy that takes into account the spatial constraints as Ps and the MDP policy that treats
all the buildings as equidistant from the central station as Pe .
The MDP policies are generated for two buildings L1 and L2 where building L2 is located
at twice the distance of the building L1 from the central station. The policies were generated
using two resource availability conditions. a) scarce resources (with six firefighters) and b)
abundant resources (with twenty firefighters).
Since both policies consist of a large number of states (i.e. 441 states), for our presentation
we selected a small number of states to highlight the differences in the decision making process
using these policies. Both policies allocate all the available firefighters to the buildings, even
when a lower number of firefighters might have been sufficient to extinguish the fires.

5.2.7.1

Comparison of policies under scarce resource availability

Table 5.4 shows the policy decisions made using Pe and Ps with limited number of available
firefighters.
The first state (MD-MED,MD-MED) shows the case when both building L1 and L2 are
of medium size and burning at medium fire level. The six firefighters available to extinguish
the fires can not put out both the fires at the same time. Any division of available firefighters
to both buildings (e.g. (3,3)) is likely to result in both buildings getting completely burnt.
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So, the MDPs decide to allocate maximum number of firefighters to one of the buildings.
Since, the two buildings are at the same distance from the water source with policy Pe , it
picks one of the buildings arbitrarily (in this case L2 ) and allocates all the firefighters to
it. However, with policy Ps , all the firefighters are allocated to the closer building L1 . So,
given two tasks with equal conditions, the policy Ps prefers a closer task over the one that
is farther away from the central station.
The second state (SM-LOW,SM-LOW-BURNT) shows the case when building L1 is small
and burning at low fire level, while building L2 is also small and has been extinguished.
Since only 3 firefighters are sufficient to extinguish a small building at low fire level (with
probability 1.0), the policy Pe allocates 3 firefighters to the building L1 and the rest are
allocated to the building L2 .. The policy Ps , however, takes into account the cost of sending
the firefighters to the farther building L2 (which is already extinguished) and therefore
allocates all the firefighters to the closer building.
The third state (SM-LOW-BURNT,SM-LOW) shows the case similar to the previous
one. But in this case, the closer building is already extinguished, while the farther building
is burning at low fire level. The policy Pe results in allocating all the firefighters to the farther
building, while the policy Ps results in allocating minimally required number of firefighters
to the farther buildings (i.e. 3 firefighters for small building at low fire). The rest of the
firefighters are allocated to the closer building.
The fourth state (SM-LOW,MD-LOW) shows the case when building L1 is small and
burning at low fire level, while the building L2 is medium and is also burning at low fire
level. Although it requires 3 firefighters to extinguish a small building at low fire level and
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Table 5.5: Comparison of MDP policies with large number of available firefighters
State (L1 , L2 )
Pe
Ps
(SM-LOW,SM-MED) (3, 17) (7, 13)
(SM-LOW,LG-LOW) (3, 17) (6, 14)
(MD-LOW,SM-LOW) (12, 8) (17, 3)
(LG-MED,MD-LOW) (15, 5) (15, 5)
6 firefighters to extinguish a medium building at low fire level, both the policies result in
allocating 2 firefighters to the smaller building and 4 firefighters to the medium building.
The logic is to try to maximize the score by trying to extinguish both the buildings at low fire
level. Other allocations like (1,5) or (3,3) are likely to result in one of the building reaching
at medium or higher fire level and thus reducing the maximum achievable score.

5.2.7.2

Comparison of policies with abundant resource availability

Table 5.5 shows the policy decisions made using Pe and Ps when large number of firefighters
were available to extinguish the fires.
The state (SM-LOW,SM-MED) shows the case when building L1 is small and at low
fire level while building L2 is also small but at medium fire level. Again, since a small
building at low fire level requires only 3 firefighters to extinguish it (with probability 1.0),
the policy Pe results in allocating 3 firefighters to building L1 and the rest 17 to the building
L2 . The policy Ps , however, results in allocating 13 firefighters to the farther building while
allocating the rest to the closer building. So with plenty of available firefighters, Ps allocates
minimally required number of firefighters required to extinguish the farther building while
retaining the rest at the closer building. A similar behavior is exhibited for the states
of (SM-LOW,LG-LOW) and (MD-LOW,SM-LOW). However, for the state (LG-MED,MD-
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LOW) where building L1 is large and at medium fire level and building L2 is medium and at
low fire level, both the policies result in the similar firefighter allocations. This is because,
there is 95% chance that 5 firefighters would extinguish the medium building at low fire level
and the rest are allocated to extinguish the larger building. The location of the buildings
does not affect the allocation because the cost to not extinguish the medium building at low
fire level is very high and does not warrant taking any risk to allocate smaller number of
firefighter to save the firefighter travel cost.

5.3

Simulation study

In the following, we describe the results of a simulation study which was performed using
the Yet Another Extensible Simulator (YAES) [BT05] framework. The fire simulation was
performed using Robocup Rescue fire simulator which is designed to simulate a realistic
physical model of heat development and heat transport in urban fires [NKB04].
The main focus of this simulation study was to evaluate the MDP based allocation
strategy for a physical world where the tasks at hand evolved dynamically and became more
difficult with the passage of time. Therefore, we ignored the spatial consideration during
this simulation study and assumed that all the buildings were equidistant from the central
water source.
The simulations were run with 100 buildings of random sizes. Each simulation was run
for 100 cycles where a simulation cycle was treated as being equivalent to the time it took for
a firefighter to move from the water source to the building, sprinkle the water on the building
and come back to the water source to refill its water tank. We assumed that, for individual
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firefighter, this process could take 60 minutes. We also assumed that each firefighter can be
re-assigned to new a building at the beginning of each simulation cycle. As the cycle involves
a movement to the water source, moving to a different building does not incur additional
penalty.
At the end of each simulation, a score was obtained based on the state of the buildings.
The scoring mechanism was similar to the one used by the Robocup Rescue simulation
environment. If Ai represents the total area of the building i, Bi represents the unburnt area
of the building i and Np is the number of buildings in state Sp then the score for state Sp is
computed as shown in Equation 5.7.
PNp
score(Sp ) = 100 × Pl=1
Np

Bl

l=1 Al

(5.7)

where, for a given building i which is at fire level Fi ,

Bi =






Ai × 3/4, if Fi ∈ {LOW-FIRE,LOW-BURNT}









Ai × 1/2, if Fi ∈ {MEDIUM-FIRE,MEDIUM-BURNT}




Ai × 1/4, if Fi ∈ {HIGH-FIRE,HIGH-BURNT}









0,
otherwise.

(5.8)

The MDP policy was learnt offline for all the combinations of three building sizes (i.e.
SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE) and with six available firefighters. Under these assumptions, we had to learn policies for 33 = 27 different MDPs where each MDP consisted of
73 = 343 states and 28 possible coalition actions from each state. It took about eight to
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ten hours to learn all the policies on a 2.66 GHz Pentium 4 machine with 1 GB RAM using
value iteration algorithm.
During simulation, the allocations to the buildings were made by incrementally selecting
three of the non-assigned buildings (i.e. the buildings which had not been allocated any
firefighters yet) at a time and optimally allocating six firefighters between them.
Under disaster response conditions, it is unrealistic to expect that every fire will be
attended to as soon as it started. To simulate more realistic response times, a certain
number of buildings in the simulation were “pre-burnt” for a random amount of time. Preburning simply meant letting the fire model evolve for a predetermined amount of time with
no firefighter assigned to the building.
The simulation was repeated 100 times with different initial conditions. We report the
average score and the 95% confidence interval.

5.3.1

Baseline algorithms

In order to evaluate the MDP based firefighter allocation approach, we have implemented
several approaches based on empirical considerations.
Allocate equal number of firefighters to the fires: In this approach, the available
firefighters were allocated uniformly to the fires. If the number of available firefighters is
denoted with m, and the number of remaining fires to be allocated with n, then the allocation
was made as follows:
• if m <= n: Exactly one firefighter was allocated to the first m fires
• if m > n: Exactly b m
c firefighter was allocated to the n fires. The remaining m − b m
c
n
n
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firefighters were allocated to first m − b m
c fires.
n
We shall refer to this allocation scheme as “UNIFORM ALLOCATION”.
Allocate firefighters uniformly to randomly selected fires: In this approach, at
each simulation cycle, the algorithm selected one of the firefighters and allocated it to a
randomly selected fire. This process was repeated until all available firefighters had been
allocated.
We shall refer to this allocation scheme as “UNIFORM RANDOM ALLOCATION”.
Allocate multiple firefighters to randomly selected fires: In this approach, at each
simulation cycle, the algorithm selected a random number of firefighters between 1 and 4
and allocated them to a randomly selected fire. This process was repeated until all available
firefighters had been allocated.
We shall refer to this allocation scheme as “CLUSTERED RANDOM ALLOCATION”.
Allocate firefighters based on the area of the building: In this approach, at each
simulation cycle, the algorithm allocated certain number of firefighters to the selected fire
based on the size of the building. The small building was allocated 2, medium building
was allocated 3 and were the large building was allocated 4 firefighters. This process was
repeated until all available firefighters had been allocated.
We shall refer to this allocation scheme as “HEURISTIC ALLOCATION”.

5.3.2

Results

In the following, we present and interpret the results of our experiments. To put the results
in perspective, we note that for all of our experiments, the maximum attainable score is
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75. This is because every building is initially put on fire and the best possible outcome is
to extinguish all of them at their initial fire level (as shown in the scoring mechanism in
Equation 5.7).
We ran a series of experiments with increased number of firefighters available to extinguish
the fires. Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9, Figure 5.10, Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 show the results
with 25, 50, 75, 100 and 125 firefighters respectively.
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Figure 5.8: Evaluation of allocation strategies for 100 fires and 25 firefighters. This being
a scenario with a low number of resources, the maximum score attained is approximately
17. The MDP based allocation approach performs better than all the other approaches,
followed by the “HEURISTIC” approach. The “UNIFORM RANDOM” approach performs
the worst. This is because it tries to allocate equal number of firefighters to the fires. Since
fires usually require multiple firefighters to extinguish them and the number of firefighters
required to extinguish the fire increases with time, it results in very few fires actually getting
extinguished.
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Figure 5.9: Evaluation of allocation strategies for 100 fires and 50 firefighters. The MDP
based allocation approach performs better than all the other approaches. The maximum
score attained improves to around 33. The score gets lower with the increased preburning
of the buildings.
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Figure 5.10: Evaluation of allocation strategies for 100 fires and 75 firefighters. The MDP
based allocation approach again performs better than all the other approaches. The maximum score attained improves to around 45. The impact of preburning is now more evident
on the score. This indicates that with more available firefighters there is larger penalty for
delaying the allocation of firefighters to the fires.
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Figure 5.11: Evaluation of allocation strategies for 100 fires and 100 firefighters: The MDP
based allocation approach performs better than all the other approaches and with increased
margins from the heuristic based approach. The maximum score attained now improves
to around 52. The “CLUSTERED RANDOM” approach performs better than both “UNIFORM” and “UNIFORM RANDOM” allocation approaches. This is because it is better to
put more firefighters to some fires and extinguish them early rather than allocating equal
but small number of firefighters to all the fires (since buildings with insufficient firefighters
allocated to them would eventually be highly or completely burnt).
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Figure 5.12: Evaluation of allocation strategies for 100 fires and 125 firefighters: The maximum score attained by the MDP based allocation now improves to around 60. The “UNIFORM RANDOM” approach now performs better than the “UNIFORM” allocation scheme.
This is because with more available firefighters, it is likely to allocate multiple firefighters
to a randomly selected fire. The “UNIFORM” approach still allocates equal number of firefighters to all the fires, so most of the fires (except the first 25 fires which get two), would
be allocated only one firefighter. Thus it can not extinguish many fires.
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The MDP based allocation approach clearly performed better than all the other approaches, specially with the increased number of available firefighters. The “HEURISTIC”
approach performed reasonably well with small number of firefighters. This was because: a)
even with optimal firefighter allocations with MDP, many buildings could not be extinguished
with fewer number of available firefighters and b) the heuristic was quite conservative in its
allocations.
However, the difference between MDP and the heuristic based approach grew with the
increased number of firefighters. This is because with large number of available firefighters,
the MDP based approach could allocate the optimal number of firefighters to the key fires,
while the heuristic allocated conservatively and thus resulted in not being able to extinguish
some of the key fires. An example of such non-optimal allocation would be with a state
(SM-MED, MD-LOW), which specifies a small building on medium fire level and a medium
building on low fire level. If there were 5 firefighters available for allocation, the heuristic
based approach would allocate (2,3), i.e. two firefighters to the small building and 3 firefighters to the medium building. This allocation might results in a state of (SM-MED-BURNT,
MD-MED-BURNT) after the firefighters have worked on the fires for some amount of time.
With MDP, the optimal allocation would be to first extinguish the medium building on low
fire (i.e. (0,5) allocation); which can be achieved quite quickly. Later on, the MDP would
allocate to the small building which might have increased to the next fire level by that time.
This would result in a state like (SM-HIGH-BURNT, MD-LOW-BURNT). Now, since the
small building is of about 1,000 sq ft and medium building is of about 2,000 sq ft, the reward
obtained by the heuristic would be ((1/2 × 1000 + 1/2 × 2000)/3000) × 100 = 50. While the
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MDP allocation results in a higher reward of ((1/4 × 1000 + 3/4 × 2000)/3000) × 100 = 58.3.
The “UNIFORM”, “UNIFORM RANDOM” and “CLUSTERED RANDOM” approaches,
in general, performed significantly worse. For a small number of firefighters, the worst approach appears to be “UNIFORM RANDOM”, which allocated a uniform number of firefighters to randomly selected fires at each simulation cycle. Since buildings usually require
more than one firefighter to extinguish them, it performed worse than the “CLUSTERED
RANDOM” approach which allocates a group of firefighters to the fires. Also, since it does
not focus on certain buildings (i.e. it keeps changing the allocation at every simulation cycle),
it performs worse than the “UNIFORM” approach which keeps allocating the same number
of firefighters to the same set of non-extinguished buildings at every simulation cycle.
However, with the increased number of firefighters, the “UNIFORM RANDOM” approach tends to perform slightly better than the “UNIFORM” approach. This is because,
with increased number of available firefighters, the uniform random allocation would end up
allocating multiple firefighters to at least some of the buildings. The “UNIFORM” approach
would still allocate equal but small number of firefighters to each fire and thus result in worse
performance.
Another interesting observation is the improved performance of “CLUSTERED RANDOM” approach with the increased number of firefighters. This again highlights the fact
that it is better to allocate a group of firefighters to some fires and extinguish them early
rather than keep allocating equal but small number of firefighters to all the fires. Since fires
become more difficult with the passage of time, equal allocation results in multiple fires that
keep getting worse (because of less than required number of firefighters allocated to them).
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The cluster approach performs better since by allocating multiple firefighters to some fires,
those particular fires can be quickly extinguished and the firefighters can then be allocated
to other fires.
As expected, the preburning of the buildings causes the attained score to get lower. The
impact of preburning on the attained score also gets comparably higher with the increased
number of available firefighters. This indicates that there is higher penalty for delayed action
when the number of available firefighters is relatively large. We also observe that the effect
of preburning is relatively small for uniform allocation approaches even with large number of
available firefighters. This can be attributed to the fact that these approaches already result
in quite suboptimal allocations and the worsening state of the buildings does not effect their
eventual outcome.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The work described in this dissertation provided insights into the problem of coalition
formation among agents operating in the physical world. This is a relatively unexplored
topic. The work done by the collaborative robotics community in the last two decades
[EAK07,BSA02,BSA02,CFK95] concentrated on the physical control of the robotic vehicles.
One the other hand, the relatively large body of work done by the agent community about
teamwork, coalition formation and coordination was mostly done in an abstract, simplified
environment which does not exhibit the constraints posed by the physical world. For instance, there is a significant body of work about negotiation in task oriented domains and
worth oriented domains. But there are virtually no papers which consider negotiating about
spatial locations or time points, which is one of the objects of our work. An additional
complication of physical environments is the interaction between the application domain
and the negotiation domain: while the agents are negotiating about spatio-temporal issues,
themselves are moving in space and time passes.
One of the major conclusions of our work is that the realities of the physical environment
need to be explicitly integrated in the teamwork formation process. The three topics considered in our dissertation gives examples of how this can be done. The main technique we
used was the adaptation of existing techniques to the realities of the physical environment.
For instance, our one-dimensional convoy driving model integrated message based communication, with negotiation about attributes of the physical domain (speed), utility functions expressing the goals of the agent in terms of physical attributes and a physical model
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borrowed from the domain of collaborative robotics (social potential fields). In the future
the work can be extended to study the convoy formation on multilane highway. Also, our
proposed utility function was based on the desired speed of the vehicle. This approach can
be extended to accommodate other preferences of the vehicles (e.g. based on the destination
of the vehicle etc.).
Our two-dimensional convoy formation model introduced a model of negotiating about
spatio-temporal locations. To allow us to represent the interests of the various agents assembled in a convoy, we used the model of commitments (originally introduced in the agent
community for the negotiations in the electronic commerce domain). One of the major open
problems in this domain is the integration of the path planning algorithms and the negotiation domain. We have solved this problem by reducing the number of points over which
the agents negotiate to a small, discrete set, and re-run one of the standard path planning
algorithms (A-star) on each of these points.
An important topic for future work would be to investigate the scalability of this approach. We also need to investigate the level of approximation of the optimal solution which
can be provided, as well as determine hard bounds on the level of approximation.
Our current approach does not handle co-negotiation, where the value of a certain offer is
conditioned by the success of another negotiation. This model is necessary for things such as
“convoy hopping”. Our current model assumes that danger areas are known in the moment of
negotiation. In disaster rescue scenarios, the knowledge of the dangerous areas is incomplete
and in fact, dangerous areas can appear dynamically. A new experience or incoming new
information might modify the agents world view even during an ongoing negotiation. Agents
136

might consider levels of dangerousness, and/or probabilities of dangerousness, and negotiate
with these assumptions. Finally, the purely movement and location based model can be
paired with a task and capabilities based model, which also includes information about the
rescue tasks of the participants. Also, in our work, agents we did not focus on the societal
effect of the agent. The future work needs to involve the consideration of the larger societal
context.
Finally, in the third topic of the thesis, we investigated the task oriented domain of
allocating firefighters to fires. However, this task oriented domain is set in the physical world
of disaster response. The aspect we have explored is the temporal evolution of the tasks. As
opposed to tasks like the execution of a program, which has a fixed degree of difficulty and
resource requirements, a fire tends to become more dangerous as time passes, and requires
more and more resources to be completed. Furthermore, the reward of completing the task,
the part of the building saved, decreases in time. Our approach was to use a Markov decision
process to model the evolution of the fires and the allocation of the firefighters.
Significant future work is required in this domain. First, while we modeled the uncertainty
of in the evolution of individual fires, we did not model the ways in which fires can spread
among the buildings, neither the uncertainty of the firefighters’ estimation for the level of
a fire. For the latter, we need to consider a model based on partially observable Markov
decision processes (POMDPs), which create significant scaling problems, as POMDPs are
known to be EXPTIME-complete.
Our model also ignores the spatial aspects. For instance, the firefighters might be more
efficient of putting out fires which are closer to the water sources. Also, moving the assign137

ment of one firefighter from one building to another can be costly if the buildings are far
away from each other.
We conclude that our work made some inroads in the problem of coalition formation in
the physical world. As embodied agents in the form of UAVs, UGVs or robotic household
appliances are becoming commonplace, this research has important practical applications.
There are significant theoretical and practical challenges for future work in this domain.
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